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PREFACE

The revolution that drove Porfirio Diaz from Mexico and carried
Francisco "Pancho" Villa to the front pages of American newspapers
began innocently enough as a liberal protest against rigged elections.
The subsequent decade-long struggle left Mexico in economic and
social chaos while it built the groundwork for her political stability
in the twentieth century. The actions of Pancho Villa, commander of
the Division of the North, largely dictated the course of the revolution
from early 1913 until his eclipse from power in the summer of 1915.
Like other revolutionaries, Villa needed ordnance and materiel so
that his army could achieve victory in the field. Revolutionaries of
all factions required supplies to maintain the efficiency of their
organizations.

Because he dominated Chihuahua and other States of

northern Mexico, Villa's supply system had to rely chiefly upon
United States sources throughout his campaigns.
From the beginning of his career, Villa realized the critical
importance of maintaining an efficient supply network to fuel his army.
Without cordial ties with the United States, that network would have
been jeopardized and his army vulnerable. His need for munitions in
part dictated his actions toward the United States and toward Americans

- ii -

in Mexico. In addition, the success or failure of his supply system to
outfit his army played a role in actions in combat and his military
strategy. This study will trace the foundations of his supply system,
its relationship to the policies Villa carried forth, and the impact that
system had on Villa's ultimate demise.

History

Stewart, Christopher R. , M.A., 1979
Pancho Villa's Munitions (140 pp.)
/

Director: Manuel Machado

/

This study examined the structure and function of Francisco "Pancho"
Villa's ordnance and munition system from the outset of 1913 until the
end of 1915. The study sought to establish the relationship between
Villa's military successes and failures in the Mexican Revolution and
his supply organization. Because Villa often publicly stressed the
importance of munitions in explaining his campaigns, special atten
tion was given to Villa's public claims about supply and the actual
state of his ordnance strength as determined by this research.
In orderto determine the origin of Villa's military supplies, how
Villa financed payment, and what quantities he accumulated during
the three years of the Mexican Revolution analyzed in this, several
primary sources were used. After consulting a wide-range of secon
dary works, research focused heavily on Records of the Department of
State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929, Record
Group 59, National Archives, M-274, Call Number 502. In addition,
other critical information came from The Foreign Relations of the
United States, The American Republics, 1913, 1914, 1915; The New
York Times; The William F . Buckley Papers; and The United States
Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations (Fall Committee) 1919-1920,
Vol. 1 and Vol. 2 . Because Villa purchased almost all of his muni
tions through the United States, research relied on no Mexican language
material.
This study reached several conclusions. Munition supply proved
important to Villa's early military success in the revolution prior to
December 1914. After that time, the acquisition of munitions was
less critical to Villa's military demise than his faulty tactics, contrary
to the explanations (given by Villa). Research showed that Villa's
army was well supplied with munitions throughout the decisive summer
of 1915. His pivotal defeats at Celaya and Leon were not the result of
a breakdown in supply but rather because he lacked sound military
judgement. Research also supported other studies which linked
Germany with Mexican revolutionaries. The quantity of munitions
Villa received indicated that German financing of Villa most certainly
began as early as April 1915, several months prior to the date hereto
fore suspected.
- iv -
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CHAPTER I

I NTRODUCTION

The Revolution
Porfirio Diaz ruled Mexico for thirty-five years. At the end of
his long reign in 1910, mass discontent with his government had
reached a point at which opposition, no matter how timid, met popular
support. Francisco Madero, an eccentric hacendado, campaigned
vigorously and unsuccessfully to unseat Diaz from the Presidency in
the elections of 1910.

Madero escaped to the United States.

Labeling

the elections a fraud, Madero issued a manifesto—known as the Plan
of San Luis Potosi—calling on the Mexican people to revolt against
the old dictator. Much to the surprise of all, this appeal drew wide
spread support. Simultaneous rebellions in Morelos, Mexico City,
and Chihuahua led to Diaz's resignation and the subsequent election
of Madero as President in the fall of 1911 . Madero discovered that
victory over Diaz was more easily achieved than the pacification of
Mexico.

In February 1913, Victoriano Huerta directed a revolt which

toppled Madero's government and threw Mexico into renewed civil war.
News of the coup traveled quickly to El Paso, Texas, where
Pancho Villa had temporarily established a home. Villa had good cause
to oppose the Huerta takeover. During Madero's revolt against Diaz,

2

Villa allied himself with the rebels and served as a captain in the
revolutionary army. Prior to joining Madero, Villa had spent most
of his adult life as a bandit in Chihuahua and Durango. 2 His mainstay
had been cattle rustling.

Having been a lifelong outlaw, Villa had a
*

natural reason to oppose the Diaz government. Villa met Don Abraham
Gonzalez, the future governor of Chihuahua, and the two men became
fast friends.

Gonz'alez, the leader of Madero's Anti-Reelectionist

movement in Chihuahua, convinced Villa to join the rebellion against
Diaz.

3
Villa developed what one historian has called an "almost doglike

devotion" to Madero.^ Madero's sincere concern for the plight of the
common people impressed Villa who had been accustomed to encounter
ing exploitation and harassment from the wealthy. Madero returned
Villa's loyalty—a quality Villa valued above all others in his friend
ships—many times over. He pardoned Villa's past crimes and
publicly defended Villa to the press. Madero told the El Paso Times
that Villa's banditry had been caused by the oppression and tyranny of
the Diaz government and that Villa deserved praise for his work in
the revolution.

5

At the end of the Madero rebellion, Villa retired

from service in the revolutionary army to settle in Chihuahua. The
Madero government gave him a large stipend as a reward for his
services.

3

Villa's retirement lasted only several months. By March 1912,
Pascual Orozco, J r . , had begun yet another rebellion against the
Madero government from his stronghold of Chihuahua.^ Villa fled
to the mountains of Chihuahua, formed an army of his veteran troops,
and began a campaign against Orozco. Meanwhile, Madero dispatched
General Victoriano Huerta from Mexico City to quell the rebellion and
ordered Villa to serve under him. Villa and Huerta, both accustomed
to command, soon quarrelled violently. The cause of the dispute
remained unclear but the outcome did not. Huerta arrested Villa
for insubordination and placed him in front of a firing squad. 7 Through
the efforts of Colonel Rubio Navarrete and Raul Madero, the President's
brother, Villa escaped death by a narrow margin and was instead
transferred to the penitentiary in Mexico City.

Q

Villa passed three

months in jail learning rudimentary reading and writing, skills which
he had not acquired in his youth. On September 16, 1912

Villa eluded

his captors, walking out of his cell disguised in a pair of sunglasses.

g

The ease with which he escaped confinement suggested that the
authorities were not opposed to his flight.^
Villa made his way to exile in the United States crossing the
border at Nogales, Arizona and eventually settling in El Paso. Having
learned of an impending coup against Madero, Villa attempted to warn
Madero through messages to Abraham Gonzalez. The plotters had
even offered Villa a chance to participate. This warning did little good.

4

Huerta's coup, and the subsequent executions of Madero and Vice
President Pino Suarez, enraged Villa. The later execution of

jr
n -I
Abraham Gonzalez cemented Villa's hatred for Huerta.

Not only

were the two men he most admired murdered but Huerta and Orozco—
the persons responsible for these acts, in Villa's eyes—were already
his bitter enemies.
The details of Villa's entry into Mexico to start his campaign
against Huerta remained hazy and contradictory. 12 It was clear that
prior to departing from El Paso, Villa received a small loan from
Gonzalez, some money from his brother Hipolito, and 1,500 pesos from
Jose Maria Maytorena, then governor of Sonora. Some time in late
March or early April 1913, Villa crossed the border in the vicinity
of Columbus, New Mexico, with eight companions. Sixteen months
later Villa would command an army of 40,000 men.

The Porous Border
Revolutionary bands formed spontaneously throughout Mexico in
opposition to Huerta's takeover.

13

The strongest center of rebellion

was in the northern states of Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and
Sonora, all having contiguous borders with the United States. Villa
and others who joined the anti-Huerta movement immediately under
stood the importance of American support to the success of their
efforts. In order to defeat Huerta, arms and ammunition had to be

5

gathered. Huerta, who ran the official government of Mexico, imported
munitions directly from the United States until July 1913 and from
Europe and Japan until he fled from Mexico in August 1914. The sale
of munitions of war to Mexico had been declared illegal by order of a
Presidential Proclamation of March 14, 1912; however, exceptions
to this embargo were routinely made for the Federal Government of
Mexico. The rebels, of course, resented this. Rebel leaders tele
graphed the President and the State Department praising the
non-recognition of Huerta and beseeching the government to allow them
to purchase munitions. 14 Until February 3, 1914, the United States
government denied the rebels their wish.
American responses to the Mexican revolution varied dramatically,
especially regarding the export of munitions into Mexico. At the out•

set of the Madero-led revolt against Diaz, President Taft and his
Secretary of State Philander Knox attempted to sustain a strictly
neutral attitude toward the rebels.

Despite the protests of the Diaz

government demanding that the rebels be denied access to arms, Taft
refused to curtail this trade. Taft believed that no United States laws
were broken in the mere purchase of arms by the rebels. 1 5

Because

no insurrection had been organized in American territory, the rebels
remained within the law.

In any event, munitions provided to the

'
16
rebels through American sources had no bearing on Diaz's defeat.

6

Although Taft would have preferred to keep his policy of neutral
ity toward the revolution in Mexico, changing conditions forced him to
alter that position. He had refused to take action in Mexico in part
because he accepted a more limited Presidential role and because he
felt any intervention in Mexico's internal affairs would place Americans
and American property in Mexico in dangerous straits. Yet by early
1912 that policy showed itself to be ineffective. Americans and
American holdings in northern Mexico suffered from mounting numbers
of rebel outrages while the Madero government appeared incapable of
remedying the situation. Taft's dilemma hinged on arms trading.
"The paradoxical part about the whole matter," Atwater affirmed,
"was that the revolutionists who were threatening and menacing
American lives and property were receiving their arms and ammuni
tion across the border from the United States, especially through the
frontier towns of Texas.
more forcibly.

7

By late February, Taft began to move

Partially because of Henry Lane Wilson's warnings of

impending anarchy, Taft had ordered that army strength along the
border be increased. 1 R Through this show of force, Taft hoped to
impress Madero with the seriousness of his commitment to Americans
in Mexico. Still, this was not enough.
By March 1912, Taft realized he had to take more drastic
action—short of intervention—if Americans were to be safeguarded.
Since American investment and American citizens in Mexico were

7

predominantly in the north, and since rebel power centered in the
same regions, Taft found his options quite limited.

19

Any American

action favoring the Madero government would be interpreted as a
hostile move by the rebels; thus, Americans would be targeted for
increased reprisals. Taft restrained from direct intervention
because that act would certainly provoke the killing of Americans . PO
He also had to consider the possibility that prolonged anarchy in
Mexico would encourage European intervention.

21

The final incident that impelled Taft to act came in late
February. Taft already knew that the northern rebels were decidedly
anti-American from the continuous missives from Henry Lane
Wilson.

22

At the end of the month, the rebels captured Ciudad

Juarez, the center for arms imports from the city of El Paso just
across the Rio Grande.

23

On March 2, 1913, Americans living in

troubled regions were requested to seek safety; less than two weeks
later an embargo on the shipment of munitons into Mexico was
^ 24
imposed.
The Madero government had long-pressed for just such an act.

25

However, as first employed, the embargo denied munitions to both
rebel and government buyers. The Presidential Proclamation cut off
all shipments, although the Joint Congressional Resolution empowered
the president to grant exceptions to the embargo. By March 26, Taft
decided to permit Madero's government to import munitions.

26

This

8

policy remained in effect through the remainder of 1912 and well into
1913 for the official government of Mexico. The hesitation in granting
import privileges to Madero's government may have been made in
hopes of delaying rebel reprisals against American properties and
citizens.

By making no special announcement of this action, Taft

might have hoped to disguise American policy and thus to forestall
rebel retaliation.

If so, he failed. The rebels markedly increased

their attacks on United States citizens and property.

07

Woodrow Wilson faced similar difficulties in Mexico and he, too,
used the regulation of arms exports as an instrument of his policy.
His aims in Mexico had an entirely different focus than those of Taft.
Instead of professing a primary concern for the safety of American
lives and property,, Wilson worked to bring an American-style
democracy to that country. He applied the "kernel of his domestic
policy" to foreign affairs.

28

However nobel an aim this may have been,

Wilson used the wrong tactics to implement this goal.

29

Huerta's late February coup coincided with the lame duck days
of Taft's administration. Although American Ambassador Wilson
pressed for recognition of the new Mexican government, Taft decided
to put off his decision. He left this choice to the incoming President.
The issue of American response to the revolution had been effectively
used against Taft in the 1912 campaign.

Democrats criticized Taft for

his apparent ineptitude in aiding Americans in Mexico.

30

Taft may have

9

found satisfaction by deferring this delicate problem to Wilson. The
hostile American press reaction to the assassinations of Madero and
Suarez also contributed to Taft's postponement of recognition.

In

addition, several unresolved territorial disputes and claims against
the Mexican government for damages suffered during the revolution
had to be considered. Taft and Knox also had to gain assurances that
the new government of Mexico was willing to safeguard foreigners
living in Mexico.

31

In any case, Wilson opposed recognition. He announced on
March 11, 1913 that "we have no sympathy with those who seek to
seize the power of government to advance their own personal interests
32
or ambition."
Clearly, he intended this as a warning to Huerta. In
a statement not intended for public perusal, he made his stand even
more emphatic: "I will not recognize a government of butchers."

qq

Coming as these statements did before the end of May 1913, Wilson was
evidently determined to force Huerta from power.

Not only had Huerta

illegally deposed a democratically formed government, Wilson felt,
but he had compounded his sin with the murders of Madero and Suarez.
Wilson's attitude toward the Huerta government contributed to
the ease with which rebel bands were able to circumvent the law and
secure munitions. This factor alone, though, did not explain the
great success smugglers enjoyed from the advent of their rebellion
against Huerta.

If Wilson had seriously intended to enforce the

10

embargo, more effective means to do so were at his disposal. The
fact that he refrained from sending more agents or ordering Army
personnel to assist border patrols was not based on a lack of informa
tion about the prevalence of smuggling. Agents from the border sent
ample and frequent reports to Washington complaining of the ongoing
illicit arms trade. Kenneth Grieb believed that Wilson's inaction and
the absence of specific directives from the State and Treasury
Departments indicated "that Washington was at least unconcerned about
the problem."34 Evidence supported his analysis.
The border between the United States and Mexico presented an
immense challenge to any police force. Stretching approximately
1 ,600 miles, unfenced, and largely unpatrolled, the opportunities it
presented for undetected crossing were innumerable. Aside from
geographic convenience for smuggling, those charged with implement
ing the embarge faced a hostile population. The sympathies of people
along the border decidedly favored the rebel cause. Consul Marion
Letcher in Chihuahua made a sound summary of the border atmosphere
when he reported, "to be anybody or anything among them, one must
35
be an active supporter and adherent of the Mexican rebellion."
Other factors contributed to the pro-rebel sympathy along the
border. Tasker H. Bliss, the Commanding General of the Army's
Southern Department at Fort Sam Houston Texas, cited the political
clout of the Mexican-American population in influencing the border

11

community to aid the rebels.

He also pointed out that those who helped

the smugglers received special compensation from the rebels; their
cattle were not as apt to be stolen.

Merchants who catered to

rebel needs both in illicit arms and non-military supplies also backed
the rebellion because it augumented their trade.
Those charged with prevention of smuggling acted less than
zealously in discharging their duties. The Mexican Embassy in
Washington complained that the authorities in El Paso openly assisted
rebel smugglers while treating the officers of the Mexican government
with contempt.

37

The Collector of Customs in Brownsville, Frank

Rabb, was the object of numerous protests from the Mexican Federal
Government; they pointed out that Rabb was a close friend of General
Luis Blanco, the commander of the Constitutionalist troops who had
captured Matamoros.

38

river from Brownsville.

Matamoros, of course, was just across the
Department of Justice agent C.E. Breniman

observed that the Custom house at Douglas, Arizona, across the
border from the rebel-held town of Agua Prieta, only made a pretense
of inspecting carts and wagons which passed across the boundary.

39

Even the Army patrols were implicated; the troops along the Arizona
border were accused of accepting bribes to allow smugglers to carry
on their work.

40

To facilitate smuggling, the rebels employed a variety of
devices which escaped detection and some devices which did not. The

12

clandestine competition between rebel smugglers and American
authorities also involved agents of the Mexican Federal Government.
These Mexican agents kept close watch over the illicit arms traders
and frequently fed this information to United States Department of
Justice agents. At times, the tips which Mexican agents furnished to
their American counterparts bordered on the ridiculous. The Mexican
Consul in New Orleans told Department of Justice agents that the rebel
smugglers had concealed ammunition in piano crates intended for
shipment to El Paso.

41

A careful search revealed no such shipment.

Mexican agents learned that the rebels planned to ship munitions
into Agua Prieta cleverly hidden in cans of tomatoes, although diligent
searches by Department of Justice agents failed to turn up the ammunition.

42

In another false lead, Mexican agents in New York City clued

American authorities onto the fact that the steam ship SUME carried
a cargo of arms for the rebels; again, searches found no such cargo.

43

Still, not all the preposterous sounding tips from Mexican
agents merited dismissal. On the contrary, many of the fears they
expressed about rebel smuggling were substantiated. Consul
*

Arturo M. Elias in El Paso accused the Shelton-Payne Arms Company
of that city of complicity in a plot to deliver 212,000 cartridges and
1 ,000 rifles to the rebels in late May 1913. Department of Justice
agents spoke to Mr. Payne and found that he indeed engaged in
frequent sales to the rebels.

An agent reported:

13

"Mr. Payne frankly admitted that he had been down to Del
Rio and other points proximate to the border for the express
purpose of getting orders for guns and ammunition as that
is his business, and he believes he is well within his rights
so long as he does absolutely nothing to assist in getting
the goods across the border, which Mr. Payne stated his
firm has time and again refused to d o . "44
Arms dealers along the border showed themselves more than
willing to aid the rebels to circumvent the feeble detection system
thrown up by the American government.

Hardware dealers and dry

goods merchants along the border imported large stores of cartridges
and guns, which they sold in small lots to anyone with sufficient funds. 45
To the inquiries of Justice Department agents as to where the munitions
were bound and who purchased them, dealers turned a cold shoulder.
Frustrated agents consistently received such non-cooperation with
their investigations.

46

Everyone they encountered sympathized with

the rebels, save the Mexican Federal agents. The Praeger Hardware
Company, for example, made a practice of repacking ammunition in
concealed packages and made deliveries to their customers in the
middle of the night to further confound the efforts of the authorities. 4 7
Two other factors aided the smugglers' success. First, the
Department of Justice agents along the border were woefully under
staffed for the task ahead of them. The proliferation of arms traders
along the entire rebel-held frontier frustrated the small staff assigned
to stop smuggling.

"We are so short of help" the agent in San Antonio

lamented, "that it is next to impossible to keep up with all these

14

movements."

AG

In May 1913, one agent policed the region from Del

Rio to Eagle Pass, two American towns directly opposite rebel-held
territory. That agent considered the job to be "an utter impossibility."
By the middle of 1913, one agent served in San Antonio with three
others who had the responsibility to investigate smuggling along the
border from Yuma, Arizona to Brownsville, Texas.

50

It was not an

ample staff for the work.
The second factor helping rebel smuggling was their own network.
By the end of April, the Constitutionalists—as the northern rebels,
loosely united, were called—had already established juntas in
American border towns at El Paso, Del Rio, Eagle Pass, Laredo,
and Brownsville, and further inland at San Antonio.

51

These juntas,

in addition to smuggling efforts, served as the centers for pro-rebel
propaganda. Since the rebels controlled almost all of northern
Mexico bordering the United States by the end of May 1913, with the
•

exception of Ciudad Juarez, they had a constant and direct funnel to
American munitions.

52

The substantial trade carried forth in these

months naturally produced arrests but here too the rebels were
fortunate.
The high profits to be made, the proliferation of buyers and the
friendliness of the public built a favorable climate for illegal trade,
yet in spite of these conditions arrests were made.

If smugglers had

the misfortune to walk into the arms of United States Customs

15

officers or of agents of the Department of Justice with a load of guns
and bullets, they still had little reason to fear severe penalties.
Successful prosecution for violations of the embargo law proved
highly unlikely.

In the first place, as Bliss observed, even if

apprehended and brought to trial, the rebels were guided by expert
legal counsel.

53

The actions of courts, however, almost negated the

need for any counsel at all.
Two decisions by the Arizona District Court in March 1913
pointed the way for future litigation against smugglers. These decisions
in indictments filed against the Steinfeld Company of Tucson and the
Phelps-Dodge Hardware Company of Tucson and Douglas effectively
condoned smuggling in spite of the Proclamation of March 14,1912.
These two companies dealt in huge supplies of rifles and cartridges
which they ordered from east coast munitions firms. Federal District
Attorneys brought charges against them for violation of the Proclama
tion hoping to end wholesale shipments to the border. These hopes
were not realized.
The court found that since the defendants did not actually ship the
munitions they sold but rather merely sold munitions to customers in
the United States, they were not guilty.

It was no violation of the

law simply to order millions of rounds of ammunition.

In addition,

since no specific destination for the arms bound for Mexico could be
proved, the court overturned the indictment. Charges, they affirmed,

16

had to denote specifically where the illegal shipments were bound.
These decisions "permitted the shipment of large quantities of arms
and ammunition to frontier towns, when the real destination was
obviously Mexico, and then, in effect, forbade Federal officers to
interfere with such goods until the final shipment into Mexico had
already begun."

54

A smuggler would have to be caught in the act in

order to be successfully prosecuted; even then, there was no guarantee
that trial would convict the accused trafficker. In the Grand Jury
investigation of twelve cases of suspected smugglers at Phoenix, all
indictments were rejected.

In an ironic twist, the Foreman of the

Grand Jury, Tom Coleman, accused agents of the Mexican Govern
ment of being at the root of all the trouble; he complained that they
harassed honest tradesmen.

55

Although Coleman was known to have

ties with rebel smugglers, this decision reflected the strongly
pro-rebel sentiment of the border.

56

Thus, the border environs demonstratively offered a sound base
of operations for smuggling.

Despite the embargo on arms sales, the

traffic in munitions continued, largely unaffected by the law. A prorebel public, an inefficient and poorly staffed police force, a sympathetic
court system, and an eager group of arms merchants combined to
speed the delivery of weapons to Mexico. Department of Justice
Agents estimated that 3,000,000 rounds of ammunition crossed the
border in the vicinity of Douglas, Arizona in 1913 alone.

57

Two firms,

17

suspected by Department of Justice agents of being rebel suppliers—
Krakauer, Zork, and Moye and Shelton-Payne Arms Company, both
of El Paso—received a combined supply of more than 7,500,000
cartridges and 7,000 rifles from 1912 until the end of 1913.

58

Through

careful attention to his ordnance system, Villa assured himself of a
large share of this trade as the revolution progressed.
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CHAPTER II

PANCHO VILL7\ IN 1913:
FUNDING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS

Villa, like other budding revolutionaries, encountered various
obstacles in outfitting and organizing his army for battle. Chief
among his problems were the raising of revenue to purchase supplies
and pay his troops and the building of public support, both at home
and in the United States. Villa showed that he was resourceful and
determined in his efforts to achieve these goals.
Until his defeats at the battles of Celaya and Leon in the summer
of 1915, Villa had no difficulty in recruiting men to join his army.
Finding the money to pay for his army's needs proved more complex
a challenge. Aside from the 10,000 peso-stipend he received from
Madero at the close of his campaign against Diaz, Villa was not a
rich manJ

In all likelihood, Villa spent this money prior to Huerta's

coup. One could speculate that Villa had accumulated some money from
his career as an outlaw, though no evidence of this has come to light.
At the outset of entry into Mexico, he received 1 ,500 pesos from Jose"
Maria Maytorena and a loan from his brother—enough money to buy
horses and guns for his small band in the spring of 1913.

2

24

Villa relied on his skills as a bandit to gain the necessary money in
the early stages of his campaign; his critics argued that he financed
himself in this manner throughout the revolution. The New York Times
reported that Villa robbed a train east of Chihuahua City in early
April 1913 and took 75,000 dollars worth of silver bars. 3

In a later

story describing the same incident, the EI Paso Times placed the
value of the stolen silver at 90,000 dollars.

4

Since the El Paso

Times had closer links to Villa's campaign, their estimate was
probably more accurate. In any case, train robbery could not be
depended upon as a constant source of revenue and Villa looked
elsewhere.
The sale and taxing of cattle made throughtout the revolution
gave Villa a more consistent income. Shortly after making his train
robbery, Villa confiscated a herd of cattle and drove them to
Columbus, New Mexico, where he sold them to Sam Ravel.

5

Ravel

played a role in Villa's much debated attack on Columbus in March
6

1916.

Additional cattle-related funding probably came to Villa

through the efforts of the Madero family—wealthy pro-revolutionary
hacendados. Since the Maderos were longtime allies of Villa, it was
safe to assume Villa received a part of the income from the sale of
Madero family cattle arranged in March 1913. Raul Madero, later
one of Villa's most trusted generals, traveled to Fort Worth, Texas,
where he completed a large sale. 7

25

Another possible source in the first months of Villa's campaign
might have been pro-revolutionary sympathizers, both in the United
States and in Mexico. The aid sent to Villa's soldiers by the people
of El Paso following Villa's capture of Ciudad Juarez attested to the
willingness of Americans to aid his movement.

0

One known donation

came to Villa's compatriot, Colonel Toribio Ortega, from a grateful
El Paso citizen. The mother of Dr. Harle, whom Villa freed from
prison where he had been held by Mexican Federals, appreciated the
rebel actions. She sent 500 dollars to Ortega which he used to
purchase munitions.

g

This example was probably not an isolated

case, especially because of the great popular support Villa recieved.
Contrary to the testimony of Henry Lane Wilson—who asserted
that Villa plundered mines and estates of foreigners wherever he found
them—Villa consistently abstained from this action, with the exception
of the property of Spanish nationals and the Creel and Terrazas
families.

10

Villa's confiscations did increase beginning in the spring

of 1915, but prior to that time foreign-held property in Mexico under
Villa's control was relatively secure. Villa did rely on forced loans
from banks, upper-class Mexicans, and Spanish nationals, however,
to derive income for his army.

11

Because of his needs for munitions,

he refrained from imposing these policies on Americans and their
companies until after the American recognition of Venustiano Carranza
in October 1915.
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The documented funds Villa gathered throughout 1913 amounted
to a considerable sum and, in part, explain the relative ease with
which he supplied his growing army. In his first major victory, the
capture of Torreon, Villa demonstrated his deference toward
Americans and his general revenue^raising scheme which he followed
through the revolution. Villa demanded a forced loan of 3,000,000
pesos from the predominantly Spanish merchants and land owners of
that city, a demand which specifically exempted Americans.

12

Writers disagreed over the exact sum Villa managed to extract from
Torreon in his first visit in October 1913. Martin Luis Guzman
believed Villa took 300,000 pesos;
received 300,000 dollars.

14

13

Clendenen stated that Villa

This confusion resulted in part from

the fact that Villa apparently demanded a specific loan from the banks
of Torreon for 300,000 pesos. According to reports from John
Silliman, American vice-consul at Veracruz,,

Villa managed to

collect most of his loans in any case, taking a total of 3,000,000 pesos
from the city. 1

At that time, two pesos equalled about one dollar.

Before departing, Villa ordered that all cotton in the region be
harvested as it was property of the revolution.

16

The Laguna district

of Torreon produced almost all of Mexico's cotton and the estimated
value of the crop approached 20,000,000 dollars.

17

Had he been able

to convert all this cotton to cash, it certainly would have given him

27

ample funding for his army. However, because Villa's stay in
Torreon was threatened by counterattack from advancing Federal
troops, he remained there only a short time. His army was vulner
able. He retreated northward two weeks after taking the city, leaving
a small garrison behind. 1 ft The Federals retook the city by early
December. Even if Villa had succeeded in harvesting and shipping
the crop, he had no direct route north toward the American border;
the Federals still occupied Chihuahua City and Ciudad Juarez, key
points on the railroad line. Without this link to the American market,
it was not probable that Villa—at this time—exploited the Laguna cotton.
Although accounts differed over the exact quantity of money
Villa extracted from Torreon, they agreed on how he spent it. Villa
dispatched his brother Hipolito and another trusted compatriot,
Carlos Jauregui, with money to go to the border and buy arms.
Jauregui had been helpful to Villa in his escape from prison and had
joined Villa's original band crossing into Mexico from the United
States. After a short squabble with General Tomas Urbina who
attempted to pocket a portion of the loot for himself, Hipolito Villa
and Jauregui took the money to the vicinity of Ojinaga where they
transacted their business.

19

Since no further record of their actions
20

appeared, "one can surmise they were successful in their mission."

With an army then numbering between 6,000 and 9,000 soldiers,
Villa moved in early November against the remaining Federal

opposition in Chihuahua State. 21 After a three-day skirmish with the
Federal garrison at Chihuahua City, Villa directed a lightning attack
on Ciudad Juarez. The Federals assumed Villa had pulled back to the
south, retreating from Chihuahua City to lick his wounds, but they
erred in their perceptions. On the night of November 14-15, Villa
led his army in a surprise storming of Juarez which resulted in quick
victory. His army entered the town in trains which the Federals
believed carried their own forces. 22 His capture of Juarez brought
him control of almost all of Chihuahua for it compelled the Federals
at Chihuahua City to withdraw to safety at Ojinaga.

By the beginning

pq
of January 1914, all of Chihuahua State belonged to Villa. °
Control of Juarez boosted Villa's financial stature. Three days
after he entered the city—before he moved his troops south to meet
the Federal counterattack at Tierra Blanca—he demanded and

^
OA.
received a forced loan of 100,000 dollars from two banks in Juarez.
In addition, in his rapid capture of the city he had taken 500,000 dollars
worth of clothing and other provisions from the stores of the Federal
garrison. 25 Having total authority in Chihuahua allowed Villa to draw
from numerous sources to finance his affairs. He immediately
imposed taxes on the cattle exported from Chihuahua to the United
States. One of the larger ranches paid him nearly 25,000 dollars
duty in the months of November and December alone.
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Another cattle

company reportedly paid him 6,000 dollars in the same time.

27

29

Apparently, the ranchers had reached a working arrangement with
Villa, for Bliss reported that they seemed satisfied with the Villa
taxes.

28

Other loot came to him while in Juarez. He collected 300,000
pesos just after arrival from gambling hall revenues and more forced
loans on local banks.

29

With a constant income assured from gambling

halls, bordellos, duties on cattle, and his forced loans, Villa amassed
a tremendous war chest with which to outfit his army.

30

In Chihuahua City, still more bounty awaited Villa. After the
Federal soldiers fled, Villa entered Chihuahua City and decreed the
outright confiscation of all property owned by Spanish nationals; at
the same time he issued his own fiat currency and declared that it
was the only legal tender for the regions he dominated.

People were

ordered to exchange Mexican Federal money for Villist bills.

31

Later

that month Villa expanded his confiscations. He ordered that all lands
and property belonging to the Creel and Terrazas families now
belonged to the revolution.

32

Because Terrazas and Creel owned the

largest estates in Mexico and had vast cattle holdings, this act gave
Villa access to 500,000 head plus banks, homes, and ranches. 33
Still more income came to Villa. Having captured Luis Terrazas
J r . , Villa forced him to reveal the location of 500,000 dollars of gold
9

which had been taken from the Banco Minero in Chihuahua City and
hidden from the rebels before they advanced into town. 34 Although

30

Guzman and Reed presented differing accounts of the seizure of this
booty, they concurred that it totaled 500,000 dollars.35 Villa also
took control of several mines when he decreed wholesale confiscations.
The exact worth of this metal escaped tabulation; however, The New York
Times reported in early February that Villa was "already in possession
of much bullion."

At that time he considered minting his own coins,

though he never did. Mexicans, as most people in times of instability,
tended to hoard gold and silver. Thus had he minted coins they would
have simply been taken from circulation. In any event, having decided
not to operate a mint, he used captured bullion to purchase goods in
El Paso.

37

Thus, by early 1914, Villa had built a solid economic base from
which to supply his forces. Estimates placed his accumulated wealth
at 5,000,000 pesos.

38

In addition to this cash, he had control over

vast property and livestock. He had achieved a remarkable financial
success, and with this money he built the most powerful army Mexico
has seen.
Throughout his rise to power in Chihuahua, Villa cultivated a
positive public image; this image aided his recruiting efforts in drawing
soldiers to his army but more importantly it helped to maintain his
supply lines in the United States. Villa wished Americans to know that
he professed nothing but friendship toward the United States.
this in a variety of ways.

He did

In June 1913, he sent a note to the American

31

Consul at Ciudad Juarez warning him of a pending attack on that city.
He expressed his anxiety for Americans in that city who might suffer
injury when his army moved in.

39

Although this might have been part

of a plan to divert the attention of the Mexican Federal army from his
real intentions, Villa knew the importance of American good will from
the beginning. A month later Villa sent his troops to the relief of a
band of American citizens at Madera who were menaced by outlaws.^
In August, Villa tracked down and executed the bandit "Mocho" Moreno
who was accused of murdering an American citizen in Chihuahua.

41

He told the press he would come to the aid of any Americans who were
in the regions under his rule.

42

The EI Paso Times gave front page

coverage to these heroic pro-American acts undertaken by Villa,
which led to speculation that Villa bribed this paper.

43

However, from

May 1913 until early 1915, The New York Times also donated much
space to pro-Villa stories.

44

At any rate, Villa made certain that

his pro-American deeds received attention.
As Villa rose in military stature, he continued his deference
toward Americans and American property in Mexico.

Reports from

Torreon in October 1913 confirmed Villa's good will. "General
Villa," Consul Carothers said, "has shown himself very well disposed
to Americans." Not only had he exempted Americans from his forced
loans, but he had ordered troops to guard American businesses and
had provided a special train for Americans who might wish to leave

32

the city.

45

-

Immediately after taking Jtfarez, Villa ordered the execu

tion of looters and forbade drinking; his ability to keep good order in
Juarez impressed consul Edwards and relieved those citizens of
El Paso who had feared worse. 4 ®
Villa hoped to make his actions clear and justifiable in the
American public's mind.

For every criticism leveled against him,

Villa had a logical and immediate countercharge. Villa took bank
funds, but he promised to repay the money when the revolution
triumphed.

47

Villa confiscated the property of the Creel and

Terrazas families, but he decreed that their estates would be divided
among the widows and orphans of the revolution. 4-R He responded to
criticisms of his actions against the Spanish and wealthy Mexicans
saying that these people had supported the tyrannical Huerta government and had oppressed and abused the Mexican people for centuries.

49

When the State Department made repeated protests against those
seizures, Villa promised that former owners would be compensated for
their losses.

50

Villa's actions convinced John Silliman—who had

never met him—that Villa represented "the highest type of physical,
moral, and mental efficiency" possible in Mexico.

51

Villa even tailored his campaigns in order to minimize danger
to Americans, or so he wanted the United States to understand. "I
have left my army twelve miles outside the city," Villa told reporters,
"so that I can give protection to families living here and across the

33

riven."

52

At the same time, Villa expressed great regret over the

*
53
lone American death resulting from his capture of Juarez.
Perhaps
the most heatedly debated aspect of Villa's behavior for Americans to
understand was his treatment of prisoners.

He had executed those he

captured. Since the press made it clear that the Federals followed
the same practice—and since as Villa explained, the men he put to
death were "all more or less responsible for the murder of President
*
Madero and Abraham Gonzalez—some
of his critics were silenced. ^>4-

Taking Villa's side in the debate, an American journal wrote, "It is a
sad thing, this death in warfare, but it is not the worst.

The oppression

of a people such as Mexico has long known is worse."55 Villa's
agreement in January, after a conference with General Hugh Scott,
effectively ended complaints; he promised to follow the rules of
civilized warfare and thus further enhanced his image in the United
States.

56

By early 1914, Villa seemed blessed. Victorious in battle,
popular both at home and abroad, and well supplied with money, he
seemed to be Mexico's hope for the future.

By this time he had built

a reliable supply network which effectively brought munitions to his
army.
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CHAPTER III

FELIX SOMMERFELD AND FRIENDS

The Movement of Weapons into Mexico
Villa gathered munitions from the United States and Mexico,
yet by late 1913, he had come to depend primarily on the United
States. Villa's method of securing arms inside Mexico was simple
and relatively easy to tally; he took munitions from the Federals in
battles. In the early months, before his army swelled in numbers,
this method provided critically needed weapons. The earliest
reference to captured munitions appeared after the battle at Sart
Andt^s, prior to Villa's Torreon victory. There, according to
Guzman, Villa took 600 rifles, 150,000 cartridges, and several
hundred hand grenades. 1

Others reported that Villa also gained

four field pieces and six machine guns from this engagement. 2 Just
after the battle, Fidel Avila brought 200,000 rounds of ammunition
to Villa's troops. Avila, who would later serve in Villa's Chihuahua
government, evidently smuggled the munitions across the border near
Douglas, Arizona. 3
Reports from Department of Justice agents confirmed that Villa
had been successful in securing ammunition. They believed that his
troops had a reserve supply of 150,000 cartridges and that his men

39

were well armed and well provisioned. 4 The El Paso Times backed
up these reports. It observed that Villa had "plenty of ammunition"
and that he also carried nine cannons with him.

5

In Torreon, Villa found additional armaments. The New York
Times said that he "captured practically all the Federal's arms and
artillery."^

Other writers gave more specific totals. According

to one, Villa took 13 cannon; 500,000 cartridges; 1,000 rifles; 6
machine guns; 40 railroad engines; and a vast amount of rolling stock. 7
Guzman's account supported this, though he estimated that Villa
received only 300 rifles.

g

In any case, Villa's army gained a large

quantity of munitions at Torreon. He described this as a critical
victory because "it supplied us with materials and enabled me to
g
prepare my forces for winning important towns."

Consul Hamm

sustained these reports of Villa's having secured supplies following
his victory. Hamm informed the State Department that upon his
departure from Torreon in mid-October Villa led 6,000 well-armed
and well-supplied troops.^
When he took Juarez and won a quick victory over counter
attacking Federals at Tierra Blanca, Villa again reaped stores of
arms from the Federals.

His takings here proved, however, to be

less substantial than those from Torreon. The rebels harvested
95,000 rounds of ammunition and two machine guns by storming
Juarez.

Ten days later, Villa boasted from Tierra Blanca that

40

"we have completely routed the enemy. We took all his artillery
and three trains. "

11

Clearly then, as Villa came to dominate all of

Chihuahua he successfully preyed on the battered troops of the
Federal Army in order to equip his army. However, he knew he had
to procure his munitions from other sources. One could not sustain
an army by this method of foraging for munitions. Villa looked to the
United States to fulfill that demand. Central to his system of finding
arms through America was Felix Sommerfeld.
In testimony given to Federal Agents in New York City on
June 30, 1915, JoSe Vasconcelos, a minister of the Convention
Government of Mexico, identified Sommerfeld as Villa's principle
agent in the United States. Vasconcelos said that Sommerfeld had
the responsibility of purchasing arms for Villa since mid-1915, and
that Sommerfeld supported himself from commissions on his
purchases.

12

Information about Sommerfeld appeared earlier than

Vasconcelos recalled, at least in terms of his involvement in Mexican
revolutions.
That involvement began before 1911 . Sommerfeld migrated
to Mexico from Germany around 1900 after having served as a reserve
officer in the Kaiser's Army. Among other vocations, he worked as a
correspondent for the Associated Press for a short time.^® In a
method that was not clear, Sommerfeld met Madero, who, when
he became President of Mexico, appointed Sommerfeld as the head of
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the Mexican Secret Service.

14

Department of Justice agents believed

that Sommerfeld's primary duties in the Madero administration entailed
undercover work in the southern part of the United States.

15

The earliest specific mention of Sommerfeld cropped up in
Department of Justice reports in May 1913. Sommerfeld, accompanied
by Alberto Fuentes, the former governor of Aguascalientes, and
Francisco Vasquez Gomez, a Madero revolutionary, traveled to
Ciudad Porfirio Diaz. There they met with Venustiano Carranza, the
the titular leader of the rebel's Constitutionalist movement.

16

The

following day Sommerfeld returned to the United States "endowed
with powers from Chief Carranza"—powers which presumably
included munitions purchasing. 17 Sommerfeld's trail for the next
several weeks was roughly traceable due to the diligence of the Mexi
can Federal agents. Their suspicions reaffirmed American agents'
reports linking him to rebel arms smuggling.
Department of Justice agents learned that Sommerfeld traveled
to Washington in company with Vasquez Gomez on May 20, 1913 with
the express purpose of buying munitions.

18

From Washington he made

his way to New York City where he stayed at the Hotel Belmont on
May 26th. At the same time Sommerfeld was in the city, the Madero
brothers were also present. Raul and Julio Madero reportedly met
with Clyde Sheehan and Francis Bannerman, two men who had been
implicated in a large arms deal; they arranged for the pending
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delivery of 50,000 Mauser rifles and thousands of cartridges to be
sent to the rebels. This shipment had been purchased by Francisco
Madero before Huerta took power. Agents believed that Sommerfeld
played some part in this transaction. They also believed that the
Madero brothers had come to New York City to meet with Sheehan
and Bannerman for delivery of this shipment. In the same visit,
Sommerfeld met with another munitions supplier, Ed Mauer, in
order to buy ammunition.

18

As events proved, Mexican agents had

good cause to worry.
Subsequent to the Madero brothers' and Sommerfeld's visits to
New York, a large shipment of weapons left that city for New Orleans.
Rumor held that this shipmentwas "part of a purchase made by Madero
19

about three years ago."

Several field pieces; 150,000 cartridges,

and 2 machine guns reportedly were on board. Thus, it was possible
that arms originally purchased by Madero might have been funneled to
Villa and Carranza.
Sommerfeld's connection with the Madero family in arms traffick
ing was supported by additional dispatches from Department of Justice
agents in June and July 1913. "We have every reason to believe,"
they commented, "that the Maderos, while they are not actively
engaged, are furnishing money to Carranza through Sommerfeld and
20

Juan Sanchez Azcona."

Sommerfeld, the Madero brothers, and

Juan Sarichez Azcona met in San Antonio in late June; by this time,
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agents were regularly keeping eye on Sommerfeld's actions. "Felix
Sommerfeld is with them as a sort of secretary and acts as an agent
between them and Carranza at Piedras Negras" the report said.

21

Thus, it was clear that Sommerfeld had close ties with the Maderos,
with Carranza, and with suspected arms dealers in the early summer
of 1913.

Sommerfeld's relationship to Villa seemed less certain.

However, since the Madero family backed Villa, it was probable that
Sommerfeld already knew him too. In addition, the testimony of
Jose Vasconcelos, if accurate, established that Sommerfeld worked
with Villa as early as June 1913. In addition, since the Constitutionalist
movement led by Carranza included Villa's army under its banner, no
conscious distinction would have been made between arms bound for
Villa or Carranza in the reports of the Department of Justice agents.
Therefore, arms for Villa might have simply been referred to as
"Constitutionalist" or "rebel" shipments. It was equally possible that
Villa and Carranza relied on identical smuggling systems at this stage
of the revolution.
Sommerfeld disappeared from the reports of Department of
Justice agents for several months. The only reference to him prior to
January 1914, appeared on December 15, 1913, when he left Juarez
for Chihuahua City to confer with Villa, supposedly to discuss the
treatment of foreigners in Villa's territory.

22

Sommerfeld came to

Juarez, if not with Villa, at least shortly thereafter. In an article in
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Literary Digest describing conditions in Mexico under Villa's govern
ment, Sommerfeld was reported to be a close and trusted advisor of
Villa, who had been with him just after Villa took the city.

23

If this

story was true, Sommerfeld had Villa's trust as early as November
1913 .

In early January, Sommerfeld's name surfaced in Department of
Justice reports; at this time, he was reported to be moving between
El Paso and Marfa, Texas. With Sommerfeld were H.A. Thompson
and another man referred to as "Remus;" both men were later identi
fied as arms smugglers. Oddly enough, Thompson had served as some
sort of a Federal officer before he began dealings with Sommerfeld.

24

After this time, a curious change appeared in the reports of American
agents. Sommerfeld returned to El Paso on January 15. He then
directed the attention of United States Customs officials to various
clandestine plots of the Mexican Federal officers.

By this time,

neither the rebels nor the Mexican Federal Government had the legal
right to import munitions. In late July, Wilson had ordered that no
munitions cross the border. The Mexican Federal Government
operatives attempted to pass ammunitions and arms across the border
despite the embargo, just as had the rebels. Sommerfeld informed
American agents that the Federals planned to send munitions to their
beseiged garrison at Ojinaga.^ He later advised American officers
that the Federals had concealed munitions stored in the Union Depot at
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El Paso. He told the Americans that he acted on a tip from Mr. E.
Hughes, the head clerk at the Shelton-Payne Arms Company. Hughes
may have had more interest in aiding the rebel faction than in aiding
the Federals; the well-endowed rebels were far better customers than
the increasingly hard-pressed Federals. Sommerfeld advised
American agents that the clever Federals had disguised their munitions
which they soon would spirit to Ojinaga.
such ammunition.

26

Searches discovered no

Later that month Department of Justice agents

were pleased to report that Sommerfeld had volunteered to infiltrate
the Mexican Federal junta in El Paso in order to inform American
officers of illicit arms trafficking.

27

These reports revealed a number of possible changes in the
illicit border arms trading and a certain alteration of Sommerfeld's
role. A man who had once been considered a criminal now worked in
conjunction with American officers charged with preventing smuggling.
This information reconfirmed the suspicions of the Mexican Federal
Government which had long believed that American law officers worked
hand in hand with the rebels.

28

These reports also attested to the

intelligence and, perhaps, cleverness of Sommerfeld.

By directing

the attention of American officers toward the Huerta smugglers, he
diverted them from acting against the rebels. That the Custom
Officers and Department of Justice agents cooperated with Sommerfeld—
a known rebel smuggler—might have simply been interpreted as great
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cleverness by Sommerfeld and a decided lack of the same by American
agents.
However, Sommerfeld's ability to gain the confidence of the
American agents probably resulted more from the conditions along the
border in January 1914, than it did from the gullible character of
American officers. Efforts to curtail rebel smuggling took place amid
a decidedly hostile environment for American operatives charged with
this duty.

Understaffed and overmatched by the sheer volume of the

illegal arms trade, agents drew the wrath of most El Paso residents
from the start of the revolution.

29

Agents undoubtedly knew the

rumors, abundant in mid-January, that the President planned to
30
rescind the embargo and open the border to unlimited arms trade.
Believing that the best of their efforts to stop smugglers were probably
for naught with the impending suspension of the embargo, agents may
have been more willing to direct their actions against the Federal
smugglers than the more popular rebel faction. There was the added
chance that Sommerfeld intended to exhaust the energy of the American
operatives. The numbers of false leads given to the Americans by
opposing sides in the smuggling community undeniably reduced the
zeal they had to catch smugglers. Whether done consciously or not,
these unsubstantiated tips aided smuggling.
Between the outset of his campaign against Huerta and his capture
of Jijarez, Villa probably relied more on captured munitions from his
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battles than on smuggling. After the capture of Juarez, having direct
access to American suppliers, he depended on the United States to
fill his needs.

He did engage in smuggling from the beginning, though

the quantities he received prior to taking Juarez did not match those he
received afterwards. In June and July Villa based his army around
Ascencion where he awaited the arrival of munitions from the United
States.

31

According to Clendeneh, Villa had already established his

32
smuggling operations at El Paso prior to departing for war.
Whether
Sommerfeld played a role in the operation at this time was not dis
covered. Most evidence suggested that Villa received munitions from
the United States in these months. The El Paso Times reported that
200,000 cartridges crossed the border near that town in late June.

33

Since the Mexican Federals still had the privilege of importing any
munitions they requested, it was obvious that this shipment went to the
rebels. Villa commanded the strongest rebel force outside of Juarez.
Further evidence suggesting that Villa armed his troops through
American sources came from Consul Edwards in Ciudad Juarez who
reported in early July that "Villa and Ortega are said to have money
and are paying for what they get."

34

Since these reports predated the

first reported successes Villa had in taking armaments from Federal
troops in battle, it seemed obvious he secured arms from America.
Villa evidently did not get all he paid for. On July 16, 1913,
Federal agents seized a large shipment of ammunition believed to be
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destined for Villa.

35

The 448,000 cartridges, valued at 20,000 dollars

had been hidden underneath mounds of coal in boxcars at an El Paso
railroad yard.

Federal agents were not always so lucky. At the

same time this ammunition was discovered, Colonel Ortega, Villa's
subordinate, smuggled 90,000 rounds across the border near El Paso. 37
Since Villa had netted from 75,000 dollars to 90,000 dollars from his
train robbery in April, the money could have purchased almost
1 ,000,000 cartridges.
Villa and Ortega had forged a strong friendship by this time and
they operated in the same regions.

It was sensible to assume that they

shared the same smuggling operation. Ortega served loyally with
the Division of the North until his death in combat in the summer of
1914.

38

Department of Justice reports linkedOrtega to smuggling

forays in early June 1913 and throughout that summer.39 In August,
they reported Ortega smuggled another 40,000 rounds across the
border near Fabens, Texas, a favorite location for clandestine operations.
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Villa probably shared in Ortega's supplies.

Villa accumulated sufficient ammunition while in Ascensfon to
*

enable him to rout the Federals at San Andres in August. This
victory, as noted earlier, brought him additional munitions.

41

Further

evidence linking Villa to smuggling came from Tasker H. Bliss; he
reported that in the weeks when Villa had gone south to take Torreon,
there had been a marked decline in smuggling near El Paso.

42

49

Any doubts about the efficiency of Villa's supply system dis
appeared following his capture of Jdarez.

Plentiful munitions were

just across the river. Of the four major arms dealers along the
border, two maintained headquarters in the city of El Paso. These
two firms, Shelton-Payne Arms Company and Krakauer, Zork, and
Moye, along with the Steinfeld Company of San Antonio and PhelpsDodge Hardware Company of Arizona, imported the bulk of border
armaments. From March 1912 until mid-December 1913—a time in
which no munitions could legally be taken into Mexico by the rebels—
these companies received a total of more than 7,000 rifles and
43
7,500,000 cartridges.

Thus in taking Juarez, Villa seated himself

at the center of arms trading.
Tasker H. Bliss anticipated that smuggling would balloon when
Villa arrived; he doubled his regular patrols along the border in the
vicinity of El Paso.

44

Villa's immediate need for ammunition after his

victory at Juarez has been debated, but in all probability he had scant
stores upon his arrival. Bliss' precautions, therefore, seemed quite
sensible. Villa announced he found what he came to Juarez for by
seizing 95,000 rounds from the Federal garrison.
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Yet, 95,000

rounds would hardly have been enough for the requirements of a 6,000man army. This statement may have been given not as a gauge of his
strength, but ratherto impress the Mexican Federal army and to
reduce the diligent efforts by American officials to halt smuggling.

50

After several days of battling around Chihuahua and in the actual taking
of the Juarez garrison, Villa's troops had undoubtedly spent much of
the ammunition they gained from taking Torreon. Ten days after

c
45
arriving in Juarez, Villa was reported to be short of ammunition.
John Reed described Villa's army upon arrival in Juarez as being
"almost armless," though he may have overstated the case.
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By

November 26, Villa had enough munitions to defeat the Federal army
at Tierra Blanca.
Munitions awaited buyers in El Paso when Villa took Juarez.
In early November, Krakauer, Zork, and Moye had 446,000 rounds and
100 carbines in their warehouses.

48

It was possible Villa took advan

tage of this situation prior to departing to face the Federals, though
smuggling undoubtedly continued in his absence under the direction of
General Juan S . Medina who garrisoned the city.

49

After Villa returned

„
50
from Tierra Blanca, a river of weapons came to Juarez.
Sommerfeld made his base in El Paso at this time and may have
influenced the increase in smuggling. Subsequent to the capture of
Ciudad Juarez, Villa paid him two-hundred thousand dollars in the
51
space of three weeks.

Villa's brother, Hipolito, received similar

payments during this same time..

52

^
Hipolito may already have converted

the money from the Torreon campaign into weapons and, knowing Villa's
plans in advance, ordered them delivered to El Paso. The smuggling
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evidently worked well.

Bliss observed in mid-December that most of

Villa's troops carried new model carbines.

53

Federal agents who experienced frustration in the past now faced
sterner challenges. A flourishing arms trade began in the grocery
stores, the pawn shops, and second-hand merchants of El Paso. These
dealers greatly complicated the duties of Americans, who had an
impossible task before the advent of Villa.

Reports of smuggling and

suspected smuggling poured out of El Paso. Agents learned that
95,000 rounds crossed the border near Fabens, Texas in late November;
another 24,000 rounds came to Juarez in early December.

Agents

were certain that the vast bulk of illegal shipments escaped detection,
despite their best efforts.
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The arrest of a few dozen smugglers—

each having several thousand rounds or a dozen rifles—did little to
stem the tide.

56

As a further blow to the American operatives, just

at the time Villa stepped up smuggling efforts, the Federal Grand
Jury rejected indictments made against a dozen noted smugglers.

57

By the end of January, Villa's position had markedly improved. Over
the next several months his control of Chihuahua and the actions of
the United States government would make him even more of a force in
Mexico.

CHAPTER III: FOOTNOTES

1.

Guzman, Memoirs of Pancho Villa, p. 104.

2. RDS, R.G. 59, Letcher to Secretary of State, August 8, 1913,
812.00:8623~]
3.

Guzman, Memoirs of Pancho Villa, p. 104.

4. RDS, R.G. 59, Assistant Attorney General to Secretary of
State, August 23, 1913, 812.00:8670.
5.

The El Paso Times, September 8, 1913, p. 2.

6.

The New York Times, October 9, 1913, p. 9.

7.

Atkin, Revolution, p. 149.

8.

Guzman, Memoirs of Pancho Villa, p. 105.

9.

Ibid.

10. RDS, R.G. 59, Hamm to Secretary of State, October 15, 1913,
812.00:965EL
11 .

The New York Times, November 16, 1913, p. 1.

12. RDS, R.G. 59, Assistant Attorney General to Secretary of
State, July 3, 1915, 812 .00H87:39 .
13. Oliver Gramble, AP: The Story of the News ( New York:
Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1940).
14.

Sandos, "German Involvement in Northern Mexico," pp. 80-82.

15. RDS, R.G. 59, Assistant Attorney General to Secretary of
State, May 26, 1913, 812.00:7622.
16. RDS, R.G., 59, Assistant Attorney General to Secretary of
State, May 15, 1913, 812.00:7508.

53

17. RDS, R.G. 59, Assistant Attorney General to Secretary of
State, May 16, 1913, 812.00:7518.
18.

Ibid.

19. RDS, R.G. 59, Assistant Attorney General to Secretary of
State, June 14, 1913, 812.00:7789.
20. RDS, R.G. 59, Assistant Attorney General to Secretary of
State, July 7, 1913, 812.00:7979.
21 . RDS, R.G. 59, Secretary of War to Secretary of State,
July 8, 1913, 812.00:8002.
22. RDS, R.G. 59, Secretary of War to Secretary of State,
December 15, 1913, 812.00:10187.
23 . "More Light on Villa, " Literary Digest 48 (April 11,1914):
pp. 859—65.
24. RDS, R.G. 59, Assistant Attorney General to Secretary of
State, January 17, 1914, 812.00:10599.
25. RDS, R.G. 59, Assistant Attorney General to Secretary of
State, January 21, 1914, 812.00:10650.
26. RDS, R.G. 59, Assistant Attorney General to Secretary of
State, January 30, 1914, 812.00:10751.
27. RDS, R.G. 59, Assistant Attorney General to Secretary of
State, February 5, 1914, 812.00:10794.
28. RDS, R.G. 59, Mexican Embassy to Secretary of State,
November 26, 1913, 812.00:10023.
29. RDS, R.G. 59, Assistant Attorney General to Secretary of
State, June 21, 1913, 812.00:7867.
30.

The New York Times, January 27, 1914, p. 1 .

31 . The El Paso Times, June 21, 1912, p. 1; The El Paso Times,
June 29, 1913, p. 1 , and The El Paso Times, July 25, 1913, p. 1 .
32.

Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa, p. 33.

54

33.

The El Paso Times, June 26, 1913, p. 2.

34. RDS, R.G. 59, Edwards to Secretary of State, July 11,
1913, 812.00:8022.
35.

The El Paso Times, July 17, 1913, p. 1.

36.

The New York Times, July17, 1913, p. 2.

37.

The El Paso Times, July 18, 1913, p. 2.

38.

Johnson, Heroic Mexico, p. 199.

39. RDS, R.G. 59, Assistant Attorney General to Secretary of
State, June 9, 1913, 812.00:7746.
40. RDS, R.G. 59, Assistant Attorney General to Secretary of
State, August 6, 1913, 812.00:8266.
41 . RDS, R.G. 59, Assistant Attorney General to Secretary of
State, September 8, 1913, 812.00:8743.
42. RDS, R.G. 59, Assistant Attorney General to Secretary of
State, October 28, 1913, 812.00:9460.
43. RDS, R.G. 59, Assistant Attorney General to Secretary of
State, December 13, 1913, 812.00:10284.
44. RDS, R.G. 59, Commanding General, Southern Department
to Secretary of War, November 26, 1913, 812.00:9941.
45.

The New York Times, November 16, 1913, p. 1.

46.

The New York Times, November 26, 1913, p. 1.

47.

Reed, Insurgent Mexico, p. 142.

48. RDS, R.G. 59, Assistant Attorney General to r Secretary of
State, November 17, 1913, 812.00:9833.
49. RDS, R.G. 59, Assistant Attorney General to Secretary of
State, November 22, 1913, 812.00:9881.
50.
p. 104.

Johnson, Heroic Mexico, p. 170; Braddy, Cock of the Walk,

55

51 .

Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa, p. 57.

52.

Ibid.

53. RDS, R.G. 59, Commanding General, Southern Department
to Secretary of War, December 27, 1913, 812.00:10386.
54. RDS, R.G. 59, Assistant Attorney General to Secretary of
State, December 17, 1913, 812.00:10246.
55. RDS, R.G. 59, Commanding General, Southern Department
to Secretary of War, November 26, 1913, 812.00:9941.
56. RDS, R.G. 59, Assistant Attorney General to Secretary of
State, December 5, 1913, 812.00:10072.
57. RDS, R.G. 59, Commanding General, Southern Department
to Secretary of War, December 20, 1913, 812.00:10360.

CHAPTER IV

THE OPEN BORDER AND VERACRUZ

The Relationship Between Villa's Diplomacy and Arms Imports
"Villa is Jubliant," the headline read.

1 On February 3, 1914,

President Wilson removed the embargo on munitions bound for Mexico.
Villa had every reason to be ecstatic.

He telegraphed his response to

The New York Times lauding the justice of President Wilson's decision
and promising the prompt pacification of Mexico. The paper printed it
on the front page.2 The paper also reported that Villa would delay his
campaign against the Federals at Torreon in order to amass more
munitions now that all import restrictions had been lifted.

3

Although

El Paso arms dealers reportedly lacked ammunition and rifles in the
first few weeks after the embargo ended, that situation changed rapidly. 4
Indeed, if this report told the story accurately, it tended to support the
efficiency of Villa's smuggling operations up to the end of the embargo.
In the first several days after the President's announcement, only
5
37,000 rounds crossed the border from El Paso to Juarez.
According
to this story, there were no other munitions in El Paso at this time.^
However, Shelton-Payne Arms Company and Krakauer, Zork, and Moye
had regularly received shipments of weapons prior to this time; from
December 26, 1913 to January 30, 1914, Shelton-Payne had been sent

at least 200,000 rounds while 1 ,000,000 rounds came to Krakauer,
Zork, and Moye. 7
Villa obviously had succeeded in circumventing the embargo but
this success paled in comparison to the arms which he imported after
February3, 1914. As The New York Times suspected, Villa's delay
in attacking Torreon resulted in part from his desire to exploit this
newly available source of arms. This he did. Curiously, in the same
story, reporters had learned that Francis Bannerman, a New York
City arms dealer who had traded with the Madero family and Sommei—
feld, opposed the lifting of the embargo. He argued that this act would
not bring peace to Mexico, but it was also probable that he resented
the increased competition from other arms merchants which would
result from open trade.

8

By March 20, 1914, seven weeks after the lifting of the embargo,
2,900,000 cartridges had passed from El Paso to Juarez. Seven
million more cartridges and 10,000 rifles had also been ordered and
were bound for El Paso for the rebels.

9

Thereafter trade increased.

By late April when the border closed again in wake of the Marine
landing at Veracruz, Villa had received 6,800,000 rounds of ammuni
tion.^ Just before the reimposition of the embargo, 2,500 carbines
also crossed into Juarez from El Paso.^
Finances occupied Villa's attention as well during the months of
early 1914. Blessed with a strong treasury by mid-January, he
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realized that with a growing army and with difficult battles ahead, he
would have to find additional ways to pay for his campaigns. The
mines of Chihuahua were one additional source Villa tapped in late
January. He met with the owners of the mining and smelting
companies of Chihuahua on January 23, 1914. 12 A week later he and
the mine operators reached an agreement whereby Villa's government
received 10 percent of mining profits.

13

The American Smelting and

Refining Company, owned by the Guggenheim family, was the largest
firm in Chihuahua. Villa may have gained additional payments beyond
the 10 percent tax on profits, although rumors of Guggenheim payoffs
have never been proven.

14

The company had suspended production for

a time but Villa gave them assurances that he would make conditions
15
safe for their operation.
Villa's second capture of Torreon in April 1914 gave him even
greater wealth; there he achieved the high water mark of his financial
security. Torreon was the center for Mexico's Laguna cotton district
and Villa meant to have it for himself. Immediately after taking the
16

city, Villa ordered the exile of all Spanish nationals.

Villa's

expulsion of the Spaniards, who owned the majority of cotton production,
may have been prompted by a desire to keep them from interfering with
subsequent confiscation of their property.

In any case, confiscation and

expulsion complemented each other as policies bringing income to Villa.
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Estimates varied as to the exact value Villa derived from these
actions. Certainly, it was substantial.

Prior to his seizures at

Torr?on, Villa had amassed approximately 15,000,000 dollars of
property.^ 7 Torreon brought him much more.

Cotton confiscated from

^
'j 0
Torreon arrived in Juarez three days after Villa took that city.
Con
sul Hamm informed the State Department that most of the cotton crop
had already been seized and was in transit to the American border.

19

The destination of the cotton and other confiscated products was El
Paso. Consul George Carothers, who had been assigned to accompany
Villa by the Secretary of State, reported that Villa shipped cotton,
bullion, and other products to Juarez, where they were sold through
El Paso dealers. Carothers observed that the sales were arranged
by Villa's own agents, independent of Constitutionalist leader Carranza
and brought arms and ammunition solely to Villa's army.

20

Seventy

carloads of cotton had been shipped to El Paso for sale by April 16.
&

The total crop Villa confiscated at Torreon was 100,000 bales.

21

22

Domination of the city also gave him control over the highly productive
mines in the immediate vicinity.

23

His ordnance system functioned smoothly for products other than
munitions required by Villa's army.

By late April his army grew

to 20,000 men and observers noted his soldiers were well armed, well
clothed and had the most modern equipment.

24

Uniforms for his troops

came to Villa from the Hayman Krupp Company of El Paso; Department
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of Justice agents suspected that 10,000 uniforms went to the rebels in
late January.

25

In his memoirs, Villa recalled that the firm's

manager, Victor Carusoe, supplied him with everything he needed and
extended him credit whenever he needed it.

26

Carusoe, who later

admitted to making much profit from his dealings with the rebels, sued
the Villa supply agency in December 1915 in order to recover money
due him.

27

Evidently, he had extended Villa too much credit.

Villa's capture of Torreon brought him some additional military
stores from Federal Army supplies, but the exact quantity was disputed.
The New York Times reported that four large guns, 1 ,000 rounds of
shrapnel, and "thousands of rifles" fell to Villa's army.28 Other
sources mentioned the capture of large quantities of ammunition,
although Carothers believed that the retreating Federals blew up most
of it.

29

Yet from the duration and severity of the battle, Villa had

definitely expended more munitions than he captured.

30

Subsequent to the battle of Torrlon, Sommerfeld received first
mention in Guzrnan's biography of Villa. Villa identified him as a
German Jew, who, because of his abiding faith in Madero, had been
placed in charge of buying munitions for Villa's troops. He was able
and loyal, Villa recalled, and "he always delivered arms and ammuni31
tion on time and in good condition."

Consul Letcher reported later

that Sommerfeld was "a henchman of the Maderos" and Villa's chief
arms purchaser. According to Letcher, Villa gave Sommerfeld the
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dynamite concession for the State of Chihuahua as reward for his
services, from which Sommerfeld derived a substantial income.

30

Because Letcher had come to despise Villa by this time—calling him
"promiscuous" and saying that, "his coarse, thick-lipped mouth"
suggested "an admixture of Negro blood"—the accuracy of his information may have been suspect.

33

Because Department of Justice agents' reports became less
complete following the suspension of the embargo, Sommerfeld's
activities in the early months of 1914 could only be roughly detailed.
However, one important link in the Villa supply network surfaced in
these months. American agents believed that by late February,
Sommerfeld had collaborated with Sam Dreben, a man long suspected
of illegal arms trading.

34

Sam Dreben first appeared in Mexico

during the Madero revolt against Diaz. At the battle for Jtfarez,
where Villa's troops fought, Sam Dreben—an American identified
as "The Fighting Jew"—served in the rebel army.

35

Thus it was

possible that Villa had met Dreben as early as December 1910.
Dreben appeared in several reports from Department of Justice
agents in 1913. In November of that year he visited the A. Baldwin
Company in New Orleans where he attempted to buy part of the huge
stock of munitions that company had on hand.
weapons, Dreben offered revolutionary bonds.

In exchange for these
36

For several weeks

prior to and after this time, the A. Baldwin Company and the
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Stauffei—Eshleman Company had been under surveillance by Ameri
can operatives; these firms had been importing large quantities of
munitions from Remington and Winchester through New York City.
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In mid-December, 4,500,000 rounds were in the Stauffer-Eshleman
warehouses.
Dreben had ties to another mysterious smuggling figure, T.N.
Solomon. American agents believed that Dreben and Solomon—who
later served as a cotton broker for Villa's agency in El Paso—organized
two shipments of munitions through New Orleans—one on January 9,
1914 and another later that month.
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By late February, Solomon was

reported to be conducting arms purchases for the rebels, moving
between New York and New Orleans in his business.

40

From January through the winter and spring of 1914, Villa
worked on his public relations with the American press and govern
ment. As Nancy Brandt wrote, "He was vain enough to enjoy the
attention that they (reporters) gave him and modern enough to realize
the value of a good public image." 41

To enhance the coverage his

campaigns received, Villa permitted ten photographers and journalists
to journey with him on his personal train during the Torreon attack
and after.

42

He kept repeating his justification for seizing Spanish

property—because criticism arose again with his capture of Torreon—
stressing that Spanish had oppressed the Mexicans and, therefore,
merited the treatment they received.

43

He argued that if he had not
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exiled them, the Mexican people would have killed them.

44

As

mentioned before, Villa's division of captured Spanish lands among
the widows and orphans of the revolution did much to aid his American image.

45

While justifying his property seizures, Villa consistently bent
to the urging of the American State Department. This flexibility
by Villa made him appear more worthy of American support. He met
with General Hugh Scott and agreed to follow the rules of civilized
warfare; instead of executing his prisioners, he promised simply to
keep them captive.
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In early February, Villa dispatched troops to

hunt down the guerrilla raider Maximo Castillo, who had attacked a
train in Chihuahua and killed several Americans in the process;
reportedly, Villa was "outraged" at this incident.

47

Villa repeatedly

assured the State Department he would respect the lives and property
of all foreigners in regions under his control; he seized the Spanish
property because he had proof that they aided and plotted with Huerta.
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Carothers reassured the State Department that Villa's bombastic
statements threatening to kill all the Spanish in Torreon were simply
intended to frighten them from helping the Federal army defend the
city. Carothers promised no massacre of the Spanish and none took
place.

49

Villa even agreed to American suggestions that a neutral

zone be set up outside Torreon where non-combatants might escape the
carnage.

50
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The goal of Villa's conscious behavior toward Americans and
American desires in Mexico seemed obvious; he needed access to
border supplies. Although his campaign to keep his image polished
did not always succeed—as shown in the Benton murder—he
received generally favorable press coverage until his defeats at
^
51
Celaya and Leon in April and June of 1915.
To further promote his
public relations, he printed his own newspaper in April 1914. Vida
Nueva reflected Villa's decidedly pro-American pretensions while
serving to counter Carranza's papers in the battle to gain mass support
in Mexico. That paper's editorial policy contrasted sharply with
Carranza papers, which tended to be hostile to American actions in
52
Mexico.
The connection between Villa's public relations program and his
need for munitions came sharply into fucus when the American Marines
landed at Veracruz.

This action threatened Villa in several ways.

The seized cotton from Torreon had not yet been sold, and part of the
crop had been temporarily impounded by a court injunction brought
by former owners.
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In addition, more than 2,500,000 rounds were

bound for El Paso (having been purchased by his agents) just at the
time of the invasion; another 350,000 cartridges were in El Paso on
54
the day that the border closed to munitions traffic.
By this time,
Villa doubted that he could rely on Carranza or Pablo Gonzalez—whose
rebel army threatened to take Tampico—to help him get arms. This
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knowledge made it all the more important that his American sources
be protected. Thus, he faced the imperative task of securing muni
tions as fast as possible before the embargo was reimposed. Villa
understood that the crisis between Wilson and Huerta,which had begun
on April 10th, threatened to bring war between the United States and
Mexico with the certain closure of the border to follow.
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His supply

agents realized this too. On April 20, 1914, the rebels in El Paso
^
were sending all available munitions to Juarez
at a feverish pace. 56
These efforts paid off, as noted earlier, in the crossing of 2,500
rifles on April 20, three days ahead of the renewed embargo.

57

Just

ahead of the official closing of El Paso on April 24, 1914, 1 ,000,000
^
58
rounds crossed into Juarez.

From Chihuahua, Villa hurried to

the border expressing hope that the boundary would not be closed
while at the same time reminding the American government of his
need for ammunition to carry on his war against Huerta.
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Villa followed a conciliatory policy toward the United States
following the renewal of the embargo; he stressed two themes. He
consistently affirmed his friendship for the United States while
reminding the State Department and the American press of his needs
for American munitions to carry on the fight. In this second part of
his response, he noted many times his justice toward foreigners and
the order and stability he promoted in regions under his control.
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His attitude did not succeed in opening the border immediately but it
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did endear him in the hearts of Americans who expected that Villa
would mount his army to attack the United States. When he came to
Juarez from Chihuahua, he assured the Americans of his steadfast
friendshipCalling Huerta a drunkard, Villa promised Americans
62

he would not be drawn into war against them.

Although Johnson

believed Villa's attitude toward the American invasion stemmed from
a desire to embarrass Carranza—who had reacted to the Americans
with much more hostility than anticipated by the United States—the
determining factor appeared to be Villa's need for munitions.
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64
Grieb supported this analysis.
As a reflection of Villa's attitude, Vida Nueva portrayed the
invasion as resulting from Huerta's unjustified provocation.

Its

articles emphasized that Mexicans must not be deceived into making
a false alliance against the United States because this would play into
Huerta's plot to save himself.

65

Villa's responses worked to his favor, at least in the United
States. American journalists pointed out that Villa, with an army
estimated at 50,000 men, could easily have rallied the Mexicans to
attack the United States.

Because of his strong will and friendship

for America, he averted the crisis.

66

Americans felt gratitude for

Villa's action and credited him with preventing war.
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This deed did

not bring Villa the reward of an immediately opened border, but it
assured him of favorable American actions in the future.
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CHAPTER V

BUILDING THE DIVISION OF THE NORTH

Stockpiling for the New Revolution
The renewed embargo complicated Villa's ordnance system,
yet it by no means strangled it. The closed border may have caused
Villa to alter his lines of supply in order to be assured of munitions.
Until the renewed embargo, Villa relied primarily on munitions
shipped to El Paso; before February 3, 1914, agents smuggled them
to Juarez; after that time, they came to Villa through legal means.
Arms did continue to flow to El Paso after April 23, 1914 in the
fairly certain confidence of circumventing law enforcement efforts—
a method which had proved effective in past months.

Despite the

embargo, 5,000,000 rounds came to El Paso by May 10.^

Still, arms

in that city or anywhere along the American border were vulnerable
to seizure by American authorities. That vulnerability may have
contributed to Villa's decision to import arms through Tampico.
Whether this decision belonged to Villa or to Sommerfeld was
unclear; it was a calculated risk which both men were aware might
backfire. Tampico fell to the rebel army of Pablo Gonzalez in midMay and subsequently became the center for large munition imports. 2
Villa had met with Gonzalez in late May at Saltillo where according to
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most accounts, the two men amicably discussed the future course of
revolutionary action. 3 By this time though, Villa and Carranza
quarrelled violently over numerous issues and threatened to begin an
all-out war against each other. Both men desired to lead the revolution.

Since Gonzalez served Carranza loyally, and since Gonzalez's

army held Tampico, any shipments for Villa going to that port were
subject to seizure on Carranza's order. The American border
presented risks as well and Villa may have felt he could influence
Gonzalez to cooperate. Villa did buy arms which were sent to
Tampico. He had ample funds and he had the hope that Gon^ctlez
would allow him to receive his munitions. Additionally, since the
American State Department urged Villa to reconcile his disputes
with Carranza for revolutionary unity, Villa may have imagined some
amicable arrangement would be reached. If so, he miscalculated.
Villa accumulated ammunition and arms through his victories
at Saltillo in mid-May and at Zacatecas in June. At Saltillo, he
gained ten pieces of artillery and an undetermined quantity of
cartridges from the fleeing Federals.

5

Prior to his attack on

Zacatecas, Villa boasted that his army was 20,000 men strong and
well supplied with weapons—having 6,000,000 rounds in reserve. 6
After taking Zacatecas, he claimed that he had found large stocks of
ammunition left by the retreating army. 7 Carothers confirmed this
pat revolutionary boast, noting that Villa had taken 12,000 rifles in
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capturing Zacatecas, although The New York Times set the figure at
6,000.8

Villa also continued to smuggle munitions through the port of
El Paso. In the wake of the Marine landing at Veracruz and the
subsequent mediation conference at Niagara Falls, the border had,
of course, been officially closed. Yet, munitions shipments to El
Paso through the spring and summer of 1914 showed not a decrease
but an increase over past months.

High volume smuggling continued

as it had in the past. The Huerta government protested, but the
United States maintained that such shipments had been outlawed.
Therefore, such protests were unfounded.

g

Yet in light of conditions

along the border, these complaints were highly justified. The New
York Times noted that an entire trainload of munitions which had
been amassed in May and June left from Juarez for Chihuahua on
June 30, 1914.

10

American policy, in effect, ignored rebel smugglers. In
reporting on the rumored passage of 200,000 rounds from El Paso to
Juarez in early July, agents of the Department of Justice affirmed
that the rumor was probably true; conditions along the border were
such that "the practice of running contraband cannot be stopped without
the assistance of the law.

Law enforcement agents experienced

some confusion because the President had not ordered the embargo to
be enforced under the Congressional Resolution of March 14, 1912;
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orders from the War Department had merely required that munitions
be prevented from entering Mexico. Authorities could confiscate
smuggler's munitions, but they had no power to arrest the smugglers
themselves; the munitions were illegal but the act of smuggling was
not.

12

While seemingly keeping to an attitude of neutrality toward

the conflict in Mexico in order to placate the Huerta government
negotiators at Niagara Falls, Wilson's refusal to implement the
official embargo worked to the advantage of the rebels, particularly
to Villa.

Collector Zach L. Cobb lamented the scandalous level of

smuggling and protested that he was unable to curtail arms traffic
without the legal assistance of the embargo. 13 Bliss complained that
the smugglers laughed at his men.

14

Border restrictions, then,

placed only minor obstacles in the way of arms trading.
Reports from the border over the spring and summer confirmed
this. Bliss estimated that at least 150,000 rounds of ammunition
flowed from the vicinity of El Paso to Juarez each week. He stated
that he would not have been surprised if the actual level of smuggling
had been six times greater than that.

15

Villa himself journeyed to

Juarez several times with the express purpose of supervising this
trade.^®
With the opening of Tampico, another possible route for import
ing arms became available, and Villa hoped to exploit it. His gambling
on Gonzalez may have worked against him.

By mid June, Villa
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complained to agent Carothers that Carranza had impounded a ship
ment of arms which he had personally paid for.^ 7 At this time, the
Carranza-Villa dispute for revolutionary domination had reached
volatile levels. Carranza ordered that Villa's army be denied coal
from the Sabinas fields of Coahuila in addition to his command that
ammunition at Tampico be kept from Villa.18

In the meantime,

prior to this wide-open rupture between Villa and Carranza, Sommerfeld had traveled to Washington, D.C. and New York, shortly after
the fall of Tampico, to secure munitions for Villa.

According to

The New York Times, those munitions had been sent to Tampico.

19

Villa complained bitterly about this action by Carranza and essentially
threatened to suspend operations against Huerta until he received his
ammunition and coal. 20 Cumberland noted that this was what Villa
actually did.

21

Villa's anger was justified. The exact quantity of Villa's ship
ments to Tampico remained in doubt, but it was certain they were
large. Shipments directly from New York to Tampico began on
June 3, 1914 with the departure of the Antilla with a cargo of
3,000,000 rounds. 22 Although the American government thereafter
officially forbade munitions shipments from American ports to
Mexican ports—as a way of maintaining the guise of impartiality for
the Niagara conference—the United States in effect condoned these
shipments. 23 William F. Buckley, who served as one of the United

States delegates to the Niagara Falls Conference, lamented this
subterfuge. He pointed out that the shipment of arms from American
ports to Mexican ports continued in spite of the embargo through a
simple device. Munitions were shipped from New York to Galveston,
Texas. Thereafter, vessels took the munitions to Tampico. In order
to stay within the limits of the law, vessels leaving Galveston signed
shipping papers which affirmed their destinations to be Havana. Their
obvious port of call was Tampico. Buckley testified that at least six
separate voyages from Galveston to Tampico took place in early June.
Buckley further pointed out that Secretary of State Bryan had approved
of this scheme.

24

Villa's share in these shipments must have been substantial.
The bitterness he expressed at Carranza's withholding ammunition
from him hinted at the size of Villa's orders. More concrete evidence
appeared in The New York Times which identified the Antilla munition
held by Carranza as belonging to Villa.

25

Records indicated that the

vast bulk of munitions shipped to Tampico over these months originated
in New York City with Flint and Company.

In his testimony before the

Fall Committee in 1919, Sherburne G. Hopkins, an agent for Carranza,
identified Charles R. Flint as a well-known New York City banker and
merchant. In 1911 , Hopkins approached Flint with hopes of securing
a loan for the Madero government.

26

Since Carranza controlled

Tampico, it was clear that at least a part of the munitions sent there
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were intended for his troops. As an agent for Carranza and an
acquaintance of Flint, Hopkins may have been involved in these ship
ments. Yet there was other evidence which linked Villa to Flint.
Collector Cobb reported in late August that Villa had purchased
5,000,000 rounds from Charles R. Flint, Company and that 2,000,000
rounds had already arrived in El Paso from the same source.^ In
addition, another of Villa's armament agents, Lazaro De La Garza—
who had been in Washington, D.C. with Sommerfeld to negotiate arms
purchases in late June 1914—had direct ties to Flint. Collector Cobb
reported in September that De La Garza left Mexico to take up head
quarters in New York City: "His address will be care of Flint and
Company," Cobb noted. "You will have to judge as to the significance
of this.
On June 4th, the Antilla sailed from New York for Tampico,
leaving just before the imposition of the marine embargo. Carothers
also identified this shipment as having been purchased by Villa.^9
Agents of the Department of Justice believed that the ship carried only
2,000,000 rounds and not 3,000,000 as previously thought.

on

After

the ammunition arrived and in spite of Carranza's orders, Villa had
received this shipment through the efforts of Colonel E. Santos Coy
who took it from Tampico through Saltillo to Torreon.

0 "j

In reporting

on this cargo, The New York Times said: "How Villa got the munitions
was not made known, but it was said that the task was accomplished
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through the daring of some of Villa's lieutenants who went to Tampico
for the purpose."

32

A second known shipment for Villa arrived in Tampico in early
July.

33

Leon J . Canova, another of the American agents sent to

treat with revolutionary leaders by Wilson, reported that Carranza
released this cargo to Villa on July 23, 1914.

34

On July 31, yet

another shipment of 2,000,000 rounds specifically consigned to Villa
arrived at Tampico.

35

From these reports, then, it was evident

that Villa had ordered at least 6,000,000 rounds to be delivered
through the port of Tampico; his source was in all probability the
Charles R. Flint Company. Of these 6,000,000 cartridges, Villa
received 4,000,000.
It may have seemed inconsistent strategy on Carranza's part
to allow Villa to receive these supplies; at a time when both men were
determined to squash each other, it made little sense for Carranza to
supply Villa. It appeared on the surface to indicate a lapse in his
reasoning.

36

Several explanations might have justified these events.

Carranza may not have exercised total control over Gonzalez, whose
army held the port.

Because Gonzalez promoted a reconciliation

between Carranza and Villa, he may have felt that by allowing Villa
to secure munition in June and July, he was working toward revolu
tionary unity.

80

A second possible explanation grew from the fact that vast
quantities of munitions were shipped from Flint and Company in New
York during June, July, and August.

Department of Justice agents'

records indicated that a minimum of 13,000,000 rounds and 7,000
rifles left New York City consigned for Galveston in those months.
That Villa's agents dealt with Flint and Company has been shown.
Assuming Villa made substantial purchases to be delivered to him
through Tampico, Carranza's policy may have been directed towards
placating Villa's worries. In permitting Villa to receive 4,000,000
rounds, Carranza may have been able to gain access to far greater
quantities consigned to Villa. If Carranza had refused to release the
munitions which began to arrive in June, Villa would have diverted
future shipments away from Tampico. Thus, by giving Villa a portion
of his arms, Carranza may have gained more for himself—all free
of charge.
Finally, as The New York Times suggested, Villa raiders may
have spirited this ammunition from Tampico to Torreon. However,
since Gonzalez's troops held Tampico and Saltillo, they probably
could not have accomplished this task without either Gonzalez's or
Carranza's approval.
Villa still devoted attention to his finances in the spring and
summer.

From the campaign against Zacatecas, he took 250,000

dollars through forced loans and special taxes. 38 Cattle provided his
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greatest income in these months, however.

Cobb noted that because

of the ongoing revolution, most of the cattle in Chihuahua remained
unbranded, making them impossible to identify and thus an easy mark
for rustlers.

Branded cattle would not have discouraged Villa in any

case. Cobb reported that Villa contracted with J . E . Garrett of
Corpus Christi, Texas to deliver 35,000 cattle; their arrangement
called for 500,000 dollars to be paid to Villa—100,000 dollars of that
sum having been paid by July 24.

39

The New York Times gave a far

different account of this transaction. Their story said that Villa
contracted with Garrett for the sale of 300,00 cattle for which
5,000,000 dollars was to be paid. This money was to be divided
between Villa and the Terrazas family, although the ratio o. the shares
was unknown.

It was possible both accounts were accurate since

The New York Times story followed Cobb's report by two days. One
deal might have followed another. However, since The New York Times
account reported that as a stipulation of the contract, Luis Terrazas,
J r . was to be given his freedom and since this did not take place,
the accuracy of that story may be challenged.

40

However, Villa

received a substantial income from the sale of cattle in this time;
how much was not clear.
The sale of cotton provided another financial mainstay to Villa
through the summer. Department of Justice agents reported that
T.N. Solomon worked in El Paso for Villa selling the cotton taken
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^
from Torreon;
he used the money to buy munitions. 41 Villa's border
agents evidently adhered to his prompting to sell cotton and other
confiscated goods at cutrate prices in order to attract buyers.

42

In

spite of various injunctions brought against the sale of the confiscated
cotton, sales progressed.

Canova reported that Villa's agents

delivered the cotton to brokers in El Paso, receiving in exchange
approximately 50 percent of its market value.

43

This policy drew

the buyers Villa had anticipated. Thus through cattle sales, cotton
sales, and export taxes levied against Chihuahua cattle companies,
Villa derived a healthy income through the mid-summer of 1914.

44

Because of this financial stability and his need for American
good will, he was able to adapt his policies to American government
pressures. When his apointee, Fidel Avila, decreed on July 27, 1914
that all mines must reopen or be subject to confiscation, the American
government protested. Villa promised that the decree would not be
enforced.

45

Rich men could afford to be magnanimous.

By agreeing

not to enforce this order, Villa gained additional prestige in the
American press and promoted his cause in the State Department.

46

That summer he announced that all Spanish citizens who had not aided
Huerta were free to return to their h o m e s / 7 Although few Spanish
citizens risked returning to Villa-held regions, this action pleased
the American government.
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Even with the elimination of Huerta, Villa and Carranza showed
no signs of disarming. Villa, as ever, knew the importance of good
American relations to his military stockpiling program he carried on
over the summer.

By relenting on the mining decree in Chihuahua,

he remained faithful to his design giving special treatment to Ameri
cans above all other foreigners. At the same time he hinted that
reconciliation between himself and Carranza would be aided by a
lifting of the embargo on munitions, a somewhat illogical argument.

48

He continued to stress his willingness to mediate with Carranza to
resolve their differences—as the State Department continually pressed
him to do—yet all signs pointed to conflict.
On the same day that Carranza decreed that no more munitions
consigned to Villa could come to Tampico—presumably he would seize
them—he requested that the United States institute an official embargo
on the border.
had been cast.
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Tensions mounted through July and by August the die

Bliss reported that the rebels in the vicinity of El Paso

made strenuous and successful efforts to transport munitions across
the border. Curiously enough, the remainder of the AmericanMexican border witnessed no such activity. For some reason, he
observed, the rebels in Chihuahua were forced to import their muni
tions, while rebels elsewhere received supplies through the port of
Tampico.

50
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Chihuahua had become a hotbed of military preparedness.
Consul Letcher in Chihuahua City observed that Villa scoured the
countryside for men and horses and rushed to import all the muniI

tions he could buy. "Nobody here doubts the purpose of his activity."
Carothers agreed with Letcher's report. He predicted that Villa's
current campaign to import munitions foretold of a coming struggle
with Carranza. Carothers also noted that as Villa built his army,
Sommerfeld had been sent to New York City, presumably to buy more
arms. 52
By the fall of 1914, Villa's efforts to outfit his army had been
quite successful. Having withdrawn from combat against Huerta's
troops following the Zacatecas campaign, Villa concentrated his
energy on fundraising, recruiting, and securing munitions for the
coming battles.

In all aspects, he succeeded. Canova described the

array of Villa's might in mid-September. "After several months
preparation" he noted, Villa, "if he does move south will go with one
5
hundred and sixty cars of provisions and the most ample equipment."
Despite the various accords ironed out between Villa and Carranza—
the Pact of Torreon, the Sonora truces—the new revolution could not
be averted.
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With troops numbering from 40,000 to 50,000 men and

a well-stocked arsenal, Villa commanded the most powerful army of
the revolution.

His defeat merits close examination.
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CHAPTER VI

FROM SEPTEMBER TO CELAYA

Villa Hesitates and Is Lost
Until the end of 1914, Villa gradually increased his power; from
the beginning of the new year until the battle of Celaya, he gradually
lost it.

After the battle of Celaya, Villa's fortunes took a dramatic

downward turn. The impact of ordnance and supply to his demise,
while not the key element in his reversal, played an important role.
In a life and death struggle with Carranza, Villa's resources proved
less substantial than his enemy's.
At the outset of his fight with Carranza, Villa's supply system
functioned with no visible weaknesses. In September and October he
stationed his army in garrisons along the railroad line from Juarez
south toward Aguascalientes. At Aguascalientes the revolutionary
factions met in one final attempt to arrive at peace, but both Villa and
Carranza prepared for war.

1

Villa's troops were well armed, well

equipped and fairly enthusiastic. His stockpiling had built massive
stores; he had 71 pieces of artillery, 75 machine guns, and an ammunition supply of 20,000,000 rounds.
had Mauser rifles.

3

2

He claimed all of his 40,000 troops

Clearly, the embargo had failed.
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The unofficial embargo had been lifted in September because of
protests by the Shelton-Payne Arms Company. While it did little to
deter smuggling, the unofficial embargo—which had been in force
since April 23—allowed American officials to confiscate illegal
cargoes of munitions bound for Mexico. The Shelton-Payne Company
demanded to know by what law they were prevented from selling
munitions to Mexico. Ironically, their protest was prompted by the
seizure of two carloads of munitions bound for Villa's arsenal in
Juarez.

Collector Cobb impounded these munitions—515,000 rounds—

in early August when Villa's agents attempted to bribe Customs guards
••
4
to allow the arms to pass into Juarez. The protests of Shelton-Payne
resulted in a ruling by the Attorney General that, because the Presi
dent had not declared an embargo, there was no law to detain shipments
of munitions into Mexico.

5

After September 8, 1914, the border had no

restrictions on arms trade. This ruling undoubtedly aided Villa.
Consul Blocker at Piedras Negras reported Villa had purchased
6

"practically all the output of the Remington gun factory."

On

October 6, 10,000 rifles went from El Paso to Juarez. 7
The repeated protests by Carranza calling for the closure of the
border failed.

8

The New York Times reported a marked rise in arms

exports following the official opening of trade.

g

With De La Garza

and Sommerfeld in New York to arrange shipments and with Villa's
substantial income, it was no wonder that trade boomed. Bliss
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reported that "several million" cartridges crossed from El Paso to
^

Juarez in the first week of October.

10

A week later, he submitted a

similar, if vague, report on ammunition shipments for Villa.

11

Again,

in early November, Bliss remarked that wholesale remitting of guns
and bullets to Mexico took place.

12

Albeit imprecise, Bliss 1 reports

indicated the continued smooth running of Villa's supply system.
With the failure of the convention at Aguascalientes to reconcile
the revolutionary factions, the long-postponed fight began. The
Convention, packed with Villa supporters, declared Carranza in
rebellion of November 10, 1914.

13

For the next six weeks Villa and

his allies enjoyed success on the battlefield while Carranza and his
forces pulled back into strongholds at Tampico, Veracruz, and several
cities along the northern border of Mexico. All observers expected
Villa to crush Carranza especially because of the alliance Villa
achieved with Emiliano Zapata, the commander of 25,000 rebels from
Morelos.

14

Carranza, however, had several advantages not immediately
apparent at the outset of the struggle. He held the port cities of
Tampico and Veracruz where revenues from oil taxes enabled him to
purchase munitions for his army.

In addition, by having these ports,

he had uninterrupted supply lines from the United States and Europe.
Atkin believed that this proved to be a major factor in Carranza's
eventual victory over Villa.

15

By January, Carranza had collected
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500,000 dollars worth of gold from oil taxes and frequently received
arms shipments.^®
More critical, perhaps, was the loyalty of the most able general
that the revolution knew, Alvaro ObregcTn. Obregon cast his lot with
Carranza when the Convention failed to bring peace.

Longtime a

leader of the Sonora rebels, Obregon had worked to bring reconcilia
tion between Carranza and Villa; yet when men had to chose sides in
November, Obregon supported Carranza.

7

Without Obregon,

Carranza could not have defeated Villa and Zapata.

18

To explain why Obregon sided with Carranza rather than Villa,
Johnson believed Obregon simply felt he had to choose between the
lesser of two evils. *13 Obregon's decision was probably influenced by
Villa's threats to kill him during the conferences in September.

20

In any case, that decision proved decisive for Carranza's triumph.
Although at the zenith of his power in late November and early
December, Villa faced unforeseen obstacles which later contributed
to his defeat. Perhaps foremost among them was his failure to seize
the initiative and attack Carranza.

Until the battle of Celaya, Villa

pursued an ineffective war of attrition which only Carranza could win.
Although the border remained open for Villa's purchases until October
1915—just prior to American recognition of Carranza's de facto
government—Villa's ability to pay for arms declined, particularly
following his defeat at Celaya. Carranza controlled the oil taxes and
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thus had a continuous income. Villa's income came from confisca
tions and taxes (or forced loans) particularly on mining properties.
Because the mines in Villa's territory were owned primarily by
Americans, increased levys against them jeopardized cordial relations
with the United States.

By waiting, then, Carranza grew rich while

Villa grew more desperate for revenue.

21

His inability to take advantage of his strength in November and
attack Carranza at Veracruz cost him dealy as the months passed.
To explain his hesitation, several other factors should be considered.
Among other weaknesses, Villa's army was not as powerful as it
seemed. His alliance with Zapata's army of 25,000 was more apparent
than real. Zapata's troops took Puebla in mid-December, but they
held it only a short while.

op

Thereafter, Zapata's influence on

future military campaigns ended. The role he played was "purely
negative;" Zapata "could only prevent actions by the enemy, he could
not compel them."

23

This left Villa without the support of 25,000

troops who were ineffective soldiers when they ventured outside their
patria chica, Morelos.

24

The disintegration of the Convention government also hampered
Villa's revolution and kept him from moving against Carranza. When
part of the Convention government defected, they not only upset his
administration but they took a bite out of his treasury—a severe blow to
Villa's already weakening resources. Villa often professed a reluctance
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to assume the Presidency of Mexico, yet he refused to be constrained
by or supportive toward the revolutionary government which he
nominally served under.

Largely as a result of Villa's refusal to

support the Convention, it fell into chaos. The inner conflicts of the
Convention government proved to be decisively detrimental to Villa's
cause. 25 When the Convention government met in Mexico City and
attempted to bring order, Villa permitted his troops and generals to
do as they pleased despite his assurances to Convention President
Gutierrez that he would abide by Gutierrez's decisions.^ Martin Luis
Guzman accurately described the anarchy which prevailed in the city
in mid-December: "What days those were, when murders and
robberies were like the striking of a clock, marking the hours that
passed."

27

By the end of December, Gutierrez threatened to leave

the capital because he lacked the power to quell the ongoing vendettas
and pillaging.

28

Villa left his campaign against the Carrancistas in

Jalisco and returned to Mexico City where he agreed to subordinate
his armies to the Convention government. These promises never
materialized.

By mid-January Gutierrez had endured enough.

The announced reconciliation between Villa and Gutierrez did
little to stem the chaos in Mexico City. In frustration with Villa,
Gutierrez attempted to form an alliance with Obregon and Antonio
Villa real, but these two generals rejected his plan and remained loyal
to Carranza. 29 When Villa discovered this plot, he gave orders that
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Gutierrez should be killed. In mid-January Gutierrez, learning of
Villa's order, fled Mexico City.

30

By this action, Villa lost not only

part of the Convention leadership and the loyalty of several skilled
generals—Jose Isabel Robles and Lucio Blanco among them—but half
of the government's treasury.

31

He could little afford to lose generals

or money, particularly not 10,000,000 pesos. Having already lost
Toribio Ortega in June, Villa's corps of competent generals ran
32
seriously low.
A final factor contributing to Villa's hesitation to move against
Carranza was Villa's concern for supply. Villa placed more impor
tance in protecting his supply base in Chihuahua at the moment he had
the opportunity to defeat Carranza. Like Zapata, Villa thought in
terms of his patria chica.
States.

33

For him, Mexico was the northern

But he had more pragmatic reasons for focusing his attention

on the north. Since October, the troops of Maclovio Herrera threatened
the region around Casas Grandes.

34

In Durango, Domingo and Mariano

Arrieta commanded armies loyal to Carranza and menaced Villa's
35
supply lines.
Other pro-Carranza generals commanded garrisons
at Piedras Negras, Nuevo Laredo, and Matamoros; and all were wellfortified to withstand Villist attacks.

36

These Carranza forces

challenged Villa's domination of the north and threatened to cut him off
from his source of supplies in the United States.
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Villa continued to win victories in battles he led against
37

Carrancista forces, yet his staff commanders met with less success.

His continued string of victories may have lulled him into a false sense
of confidence; having never lost a major battle, he may have felt he
could strike a decisive blow against Carranza whenever he wished.
Villa probably had great respect for Obre^n's ability, and this respect
made him more careful about preparations for battle.
In January, events moved against Villa's cause. Manuel Chao
38
and Aguirre Benavides deserted him for Carranza.
Puebla fell to
Obregon's army on January 6.
occupied the capital.

40

39

By the end of the month, his army

Villa's armies had taken Guadalajara in mid-

December only to evacuate a month later to the forces of General
Dominguez .

41

His officers failed in the north. Stubborn resistance

at Ebano and Tampico kept that port under Carranza's control.

42

By the middle of February, with the civil war at a military
stalemate, Villa's financial foundations began to teeter. Consul
Bonney at San Luis PotosT reported that General Urbina attempted
to collect a forced loan from local merchants. This demand for
130,000 dollars did not exempt Americans.

43

Although Urbina's later

behavior showed that he may have been more concerned with lining
his own pockets than in advancing the cause of the revolution, the
incident demonstrated a need for funds and, perhaps, Villa's growing
inability to control his subordinates.

Later in February, Consul Davis
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in Guadalajara—which had again been taken by Villist troops—reported
that Villa demanded contributions from all the merchants of the city.
Again, Americans were not exempted.

44

Although Carothers secured

promises from Villa that Americans in both places would not have to
pay, these actions foretold of Villa's financial instability.

45

In March, Villa threatened to tax Americans again, this time in
Monterey. He placed a million dollar levy on the Chamber of Commerce
which he claimed was for the relief of the poor.
exempt Americans.

46

His demand did not

He relented on this demand after pressure from

the State Department, yet he seemed more and more desperate as
spring came. Indications of his financial distress were reflected in
the decline of his fiat money. In January, his peso had dropped to
fourteen cents on the dollar—its lowest exchange rate since issuance.

47

Villa threatened to confiscate mines in Chihuahua in mid-March
unless they renewed production. In spite of earlier accords which
guaranteed mining safety and provided Villa with 10 percent of mining
profits, chaotic conditions hampered mining operations.

48

Villa's

frustration at being denied revenue resulted in the issuance of Decree
Number 5, which required mines to begin operation or lose their
titles. Carothers received Villa's promise that the Decree would not
be enforced,
for Villa.

49

but these actions bespoke of growing financial difficulties

98

Reports from the border supported these findings. It was
reasonable to assume that a substantial portion of the revenues
Villa amassed in late 1914 had already been spent to outfit his massive
army. An army of 40,000 men with carbines, a supply of 20,000,000
cartridges and other ordnance must have consumed a good portion of
Villa's reserves.

50

His confiscations and forced loans of February

and March supported this assumption.

By early December, reports

from the border indicated a drastic reduction in munitions which went
from El Paso to Juarez. The vast shipments of October and November
already detailed were no longer evident in the weekly reports from
General Bliss.

51

In January, February, and March these reports

showed no munitions going from El Paso to Juarez. At the same time,
the border towns of Laredo, Matamoros, and Douglas—all opposite
Carrancists-held cities—imported substantial quantities of munitions
according to these records. 52 Thus it was clear that records of
munition shipments were kept in these months, although just as clear
that none came to Villa.
Only at the beginning of April did Villa again start to receive
munitions through El Paso. In the week ending April 4th, he received
4,464 carbines and 1,153,860 cartridges.

53

The following week,

another 661 ,000 rounds and 1 ,555 rifles came to him through El Paso.
It seemed inconsistent that in months when Villa's financial weakness
seemed severe, he should suddenly begin to import vast lots of

54

99

munitions, especially since he had been unable to do so in the three
months prior to this time.
In late March, Hipolito Villa stayed in New York City where he
sought funds, apparently for munitions purchases.

55

This fact will

be shown later as a possible explanation for Villa's sudden resurgence
of importing.
The seeming purposelessness of Villa's campaigns in February
and March may in part be explained by his need to gain ammunition
and rifles that he could not secure through El Paso. The months of
continuous fighting had most certainly claimed a large part of his
reserve supplies. In mid-February, a report which substantiated
this contention appeared. The New York Times reported that 8,500
rifles and 4,000,000 rounds had arrived in San Diego, California via
Galveston. The origin of this shipment had been New York City. 56
Because Flint and Company had sent millions of rounds to Galveston
through the summer of 1914 and because Villa's agents delt extensively
with that company in past months, it was logical to assume the muni
tions originated with Flint and Company.

Because Carranza controlled

Tampico and Veracruz, it was obvious that the shipment was destined
for Villa.

No other revolutionary leader at this time could have used

such a large consignment.
In late February, The New York Times linked Villa's actions on
the west coast of Mexico to this shipment of arms. Villa had recently

1 00

retaken Guadalajara from the Carrancistas at this time, as noted
earlier. The New York Times reported that Villa brought his army
to the coast in order to be certain of receiving the 9,000 rifles and
3,000,000 cartridges then in transit from San Diego to a Mexican
port, presumably somewhere near Manzanillo.

57

Although this story

gave a different tally for the quantity of munitions, it identified the
shipment as being the same made to San Diego in late January.

58

Carothers reported that Villa fought on the outskirts of Manzanillo
on February 19, 1915.

59

The New York Times reported that Villa

captured Zapotlan, a town on the way from Guadalajara, on February 20,
1915. 6 0
However, Villa probably did not receive this shipment. His own
memoirs attested to a critical shortage of munitions by late March.

0 -j

Villa probably left the coast before he could secure the munitions.
Responding to the pleas of Felipe Angeles, Villa left the coast with
the main body of his army and moved toward Monterrey.

62

He left

General Urbina in charge of west coast operations. If the arms did
land, they would probably have been taken by Urbina. Yet because
Urbina's troops were badly mauled by Carrancista forces in late
March, it was likely that had he received the ammunition, he lost most
of it in battle.

63

Cumberland maintained that Villa occassionally

received ammunition through Mexico City, yet it was doubtful that
these shipments could have amounted to much.

64
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Thus by late March Villa's financial recourses and munitions
were in short supply. The efforts of his subordinates to take Tampico
from Gonzalez had failed and other drives to dislodge the Constitutionalist forces from border garrisons had stalled.

65

However, as March

ended, the Carrancistas had not been able to decisively defeat Villa's
troops either.

00

This military stalemate changed in April at Celaya.
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CHAPTER VII

CELAYA AND THE AFTERMATH

The Beginning of the End
On the eve of the most decisive battle of the revolution, Villa's
finances received another setback. Because of the protests of Ameri
can stockmen, Villa's cattle sales through El Paso were substantially
reduced in April. ^

By the end of the month, this trade had been almost

completely shutoff. In agreeing to relent on the mining decree issued
on March 15, Villa lost another revenue source, although he did
arrange with the mining companies for the sale of his fiat currency
to them in exchange for specie as a form of tax payment.

2

Other difficulties beset him at this time. He protested to Duval
West, an American envoy sent by President Wilson, that the Sante
Fe Railroad no longer delivered coal to his troops; coal he purchased
had not been delivered.

3

In his memoirs he claimed that he had

purchased large quantities of munitions in March, but that his agents
had difficulties "getting them into Mexico as Washington was not so
favorable as before."

4

It was unclear what difficulties he referred to.

This comment may have been made as a partial rationale for his
defeat at Celaya which he blamed on a variety of factors dealing with
munitions. In any case, only small quantities of munitions reached
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him before the battle of Celaya. In contrast to the summer and fall
of 1914, when Villa received ammunition in the millions of rounds
every week, Sommerfeld and Hip^lito Villa managed to purchase only
750,000 rounds in March.

5

Villa lost the battle at Celaya and six weeks later repeated in
defeat at Leon. Villa stressed that he lost the battle of Celaya
because he lacked ammunition.

6

_
Before the battle of Leon, however,

that excuse had been eliminated. Cobb reported from El Paso that
from the time of the battle of Celaya until early May Villa received
2,500,000 rounds and 3,500 rifles. 7 A week later, still before the
battle of Leon, 963 rifles and another 2,900,000 rounds of ammunition
came to Villa.

8

Villa had sufficient weapons with which to equip his

army at Leon. Yet he suffered a second massive debacle.

By the

time his army was in the process of being cut to shreds by Obregon's
forces, more than 7,700,000 cartridges and 4,300 rifles had passed
from El Paso to Juarez.

9

Although reported ammunition shortages

may have explained his defeat at Celaya, they could not explain what
happened at Leon.
All signs pointed to a serious financial crisis concurrent with
Villa's need for ammunition. His peso, which had dropped to fourteen
cents on the dollar in January, continued to decline, reaching a value
of four and one-half cents on the dollar by April 24, 1915.

10

May, Villa's agency had to pay exceedingly high rates for the

By early
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ammunition that El Paso dealers sold.

11

Thus, the buying power of

his currency plummeted while prices he paid were increased. At a
time when he had little income from cattle sales, when he had nego
tiated and spent revenues from Torre'on's cotton, and when he had
relented on forced loans, it seemed odd that Villa should suddenly
receive huge lots of munitions. This situation became all the more
difficult to explain in wake of the disaster at Celaya. An alternative
resource must have supplied him.
It was possible that Villa received help from German govern
ment agents who were directly interested in promoting revolutionary
factions in Mexico. While no irrefutable evidence can sustain the
charges of German financing, many bits of circumstantial information
led to just such a conclusion. In order to show this, the affairs of
Felix Sommerfeld should be reexamined.
According to Friedrich Katz, Sommerfeld had established a
close rapport with Bernard Dernberg by May 1915.

Dernberg worked

as a propaganda agent for the German government in the United States
at this time.

12

In the month of May, Dernberg wrote to Admiral

Henning von Holtzendorff—who later forwarded the letter to German
Foreign Secretary Von Jagow—suggesting the benefits to be derived
from an American war with Mexico. Sommerfeld, Dernberg affirmed,
pledged himself to work for whatever policy would best serve the
interests of Germany.

13
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Further links between Sommerfeld and German agents were
established earlier. In early April 1915, German Naval attache
Karl Boy-Ed and Franz Rintelen von Kleist—the man who financed
Huerta's attempted return to power in Mexico—were known to be
meeting with Sommerfeld.^ By April 5, 1915, an account had been
opened by Sommerfeld at the Mississippi Valley Trust Company in
S t . Louis. Two members of the German Embassy's staff opened
accounts at the same bank at the same time.

Department of Justice

agents believed that these accounts were made to conceal payments
from the German government to Sommerfeld. 15
From Sommerfeld's account in S t . Louis, 380,000 dollars was
paid out to the Western Cartridge Company of Alton, Illinois from
April 5, 1915 to December 1, 1915. All these purchases were con•

signed to Hipolito Villa at El Paso.

16

It was possible—but by no

means proven—that additional arms came to Villa from the Simmons
Hardware Company of S t . Louis.

Department of Justice agents

reported that in July, while Remington had shipped no arms to the
border for the past several months, Simmons Hardware had been
sending "large quantities" to Mexico.^ 7
No shipments came to Villa at Juarez from January until April.
Sommerfeld had purchased, in four separate lots, 750,000 rounds of
ammunition in March. Because "there is no evidence that the war in
Europe made the slightest difference in the volume of munitions going
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to Mexico," it was probable that if Sommerfeld had had money in
March, he would have purchased more supplies.

18

It seemed clear

that in March he lacked funding. If 20,000 dollars had purchased
448,000 rounds of ammunition, then 380,000 dollars could have paid
for as many as 9,000,000 rounds.

19

German funding could then have

explained the sudden rise in the quantity of arms Villa received after
April.
If German aims were to provoke conflict between the United
States and Villa, then this policy worked counter to that goal. Jagow's
letter, responding to the suggestions made by Dernberg, affirmed that
German interests would be served by an American-Mexican conflict.
"It would be desirable," he wrote in May 1915, "that America, a
good friend of the English, occupy itself in another war in order to
disinterest itself in Europe."

20

German willingness to finance

Mexican revolutionaries appeared plain. In April or May, 895,000
dollars was given to the Huerta-Orozco alliance with hopes of
installing a pro-German government in Mexico.

21

However, by supplying Villa with munitions at this stage of the
revolution, they reduced their chances of provoking a conflict with
the United States. Had they denied Villa supplies, it is certain his
financial and military situation would have become much more critical
after April and May. At that time, before the battle of Leon, he
commanded from 20,000 to 30,000 troops. 2 2 Because German aid—
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assuming it was given—reduced Villa's immediate needs for munitions,
it allowed him to relent on his confiscations and forced loans demanded
from Americans. He did not provoke the United States because he did
not need to.

By March 16, 1916, he commanded 400 troops in the raid

on Columbus.

23

Thus German aid may have contributed to forestalling

Villa's attacks on the United States and certainly contributed to reliev
ing Villa's need to exploit American interests in Mexico.

Pershing's

expedition against Villa would have been much different if Villa had
commanded 20,000 men.
The battle for Celaya marked Villa's rapid decline from power. 24
Because this engagement and the subsequent conflict at Leon effectively
ended Villa's military strength, the impact of ordnance on his defeats
should be carefully weighed.

From all descriptions of the battle, it

seemed that Villa's supplies were less critical a factor than the
tactics he employed.
The fight featured Villa's forte, the furious headlong cavalry
^
25
charge against Obregon's more scientific style of warfare.
Obregon,
unlike Villa, had studied trends of the Great War in Europe; he adapted
his strategy accordingly.

26

With the advice of Colonel Maximilian

Kloss, a German officer working on his staff, Obregon ordered that
trenches be dug and barbed wire be stretched around the town of
^
27
Celaya. Obregon had several weeks to prepare for Villa's attack.
The broad plains surrounding Celaya made this tactic effective; with
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supporting machine gun positions, Obregon's troops had wellprotected fortifications from which they mowed down the attacking
Villists.

28

Eleven thousand men waited in Celaya for the expected

Villa assault on April 6, 1915.

pq

At the outset of the battle, ammunition for attacking troops was
in short supply. Yet nothing compelled Villa to attack. Obregon
refused to move forward against Villa's army because he faced
superior numbers of troops and because he had built strong defenses.

3(

Villa ignored the sage counsel of General Felipe Angeles to postpone
attack, thereby allowing reinforcements to arrive and forcing Obregon
into the open plains where his troops would have been more vulnerable.
Had Villa done this, more ammunition would have reached his troops
and, perhaps, in spite of his tactics, he may have come away from
Celaya in better military strength. Still, in consideration of his
repeated refusal to modify his tactics of frontal assault—as witnessed
at Leon and Agua Prieta—Villa's delay probably would have made
little difference in the long run.
Estimates of Villa's losses varied according to which side
submitted the report. Villa at first claimed that his army had won a
smashing victory but later admitted to defeat.

31

The Carranza

authorities reported a giant triumph. On April 15, they reported they
had taken thousands of rounds of ammunition, thirty cannon, and
thousands of prisoners.

32

Later they claimed Villa lost 14,000 dead
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and 8,000 prisioners.
brutally massacred.
were slain.

33

Whatever the exact tally, Villa troops were

In one day of head-first charges, 2,000 Villists

34

Villa attributed his loss in part to his eagerness to strike a blow
^ 35 More frequently he blamed defeat on a lack of
against Obregon.
ammunition."^® In light of the records from the border and stories
detailing the urgent efforts of his agents in New York to rush ammunition to the border, this claim was no doubt accurate.

37

His troops

had only eighteen rounds each by April 13—scant supplies indeed for
OO

the bloody fighting at Celaya.
defeat:

Villa found other reasons for his

green recruits who ran away from their first combat

39
experience
and cowardly ex-Federal officers who served in his
ranks.

40

Still, he harped continuously upon the issue of munition

shortages.

41

The battle of Leon, pitting the same armies in renewed combat
in late May and early June left Villa without this explanation. Rein
forced with additional troops and munitions, Villa met defeat once
more.

42

Immediately after his defeat at Celaya, great lots of

ammunition began arriving at his temporary headquarters in
Aguascalientes.

By April 19, he had received from 3,000,000 to

10,000,000 rounds.
to his army.

44

43

In early May, 3,500 new rifles had been sent

Villa had 15,000 troops with him at Aguascalientes

in late April; at that time, he called up his reserves from the north
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to reinforce him.

By the beginning of the battle, he commanded

between 25,500 and 30,000 men.

46

He did not appear to be lacking

for military stores.
Johnson contended that Villa was again critically short of ammuni
tion for the battle of Leon, but the records from the border shipments
disputed this.

Reports from Carothers, Schmutz, and Cobb showed

that this was not the case.

47

«•
The reason he lost again at Leon had

little to do with munitions; Villa had simply learned nothing from his
encounter at Celaya. When explaining his attitude to Angeles before
the battle of Leon—when Angeles again cautioned Villa to adopt a
defensive campaign—Villa refused to listen, saying, "I am a man who
came into this world to attack. If I am now defeated by attacking
48
today, I will win by attacking tomorrow."

Rejecting Angeles'

advice, Villa opened another massive assault against Obregon's
Army of Operations on June 1 , 1915. The results were similar to
Celaya.
crushed.

By June 6, the battle had ended; Villa's army had been
49

^
Villa allowed his passionate hatred for Obregon—of whom

he once said, "I would rather be beaten by a Chinese than by Obregoh"—
to overcome sound military reasoning.

50

The Constitutionalists

claimed 10,000 killed, wounded, or captured Villista troops at the
end of the battle .

51
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CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

The Relationship of Munitions to Villa's Demise
None of the news following the battle of Leon was good news for
the Villistas. Perhaps the most critical result of his defeats in the
early summer of 1915 was the loss of popular support from the
Mexican people.

Later in his career when he eluded Pershing's

Expedition, he would regain the admiration of the people, but at the
end of the battle of Leon this was not the case. ^

The invincible

General of the Division of the North no longer possessed his aura of
victory.
His once massive army started to disintegrate.

By July, when

he began his retreat northward to his home bases in Chihuahua,
fewer than 10,000 troops remained under his command with desertions
from his ranks becoming commonplace.

2

In desperation, he recruited

teenagers and women to fight in his army; he increased the enlistment
bonus to ten pesos.

3

Still his soldiers left him. The rapid decline

in his currency made enlistment bonuses meaningless; but even with
monetary inducement, it was unlikely that people would join him any
way. A long revolution and Villa's stunning defeats had cut into
popular zeal to serve with him.

4

As prices in Villist-controlled
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territory soared and the value of his fiat money lost its worth, food
shortages followed by hunger riots broke out in Chihuahua and Durango.
This single factor, more than any other, created popular animosity
against Villa.

5

If, as Johnson believed, men fought for leaders more

than causes in this revolution, Villa's losses had crippled his prestige.
Men did not fight for a defeated general. 6
Munitions continued to flow to his agency in Juarez, yet he had
fewer and fewer troops who would be able to use them.

Now that

Villa's triumphs had ended, his generals and agents became more
concerned with personal gain than with the cause of the Division of
the North. Carothers reported in late June that "military commanders
everywhere are grafting to the full extent of their ability. 1 , 7 His agents
in El Paso and Juarez stole from Villist funds for their own purposes
just as did his field generals.

g

As he retreated northward, Villa ransacked towns for food and
supplies. Wherever he took his army he demanded that his worthless
currency be accepted as legal tender and he set high taxes on anyone
who still had "real" money.

9

He kept to this pattern at Aguascalientes

in June and at Chihuahua, Durango, and Torreon in July and August.
These actions did little to bolster his fighting strength; his soldiers
had had enough battles.

11

—
All the while the army of Obregon
moved

gradually north forcing Villa from Aguascalientes to Torreon to
Chihuahua.

By mid-September, the evacuation of Torreon was

10
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underway.

12

By the end of the month, his army prepared to withdraw

from Chihuahua, too.

13

Curiously, throughout the latter part of the summer and fall
arms continued to flow from El Paso to Juarez. From June 1 until
mid-July, Villa received more than 7,000,000 cartridges. 14 After
July 15, Villa received large weekly shipments of munitions until
mid-September.

Between July 15 and September 8, 1915, an additional

4,300,000 rounds came to Juarez.

15

In this same space of time, only

260 carbines were imported, which suggested that Villa had fewer
troops to arm or less money to buy weapons with.

10

The imports in

June, July, and August supported the argument that Villa received
outside financing, possibly from German sources. The weakness of
his financial condition had already been shown. By early May, the
Madero family no longer backed him.

17

In the light of the widespread

grafting, it seemed unlikely that the money which paid for these arms
came from the Villa agency on the border. Thus, though fighting
a losing campaign, he continued to receive munitions in bulk—from
July 1 to mid-September 12,000,000 rounds came to his army. His
defeats after Celaya had to have another cause than the lack of ammuni
tion. In addition, this information disputed Quirk's belief that Villa's
actions—increasing confiscations and arbitrary taxation—after June
resulted from Villa's great need for more arms and ammunition.

18
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Abruptly in mid-September, imports of munitions fell sharply.
In the two weeks prior to the renewal of the embargo on October 9,
^

1915, total imports to Juarez were only 8,300 cartridges.

19

In spite of his numerous setbacks following Celaya and L^on,
until the American recognition of Carranza's de facto government,
Villa's policy continued to favor American interests in Mexico. Amid
confiscations of the summer and fall, Villa often threatened to tax
Americans or to confiscate their property; but he always relented on
the demands he issued. In late July, he decreed that all merchants of
Chihuahua turn their wares over to his troops; foreigners were to be
reimbursed with Villa currency while Mexicans were not so lucky.
Villa confiscated Mexican goods as a "contribution to the revolution."20
In conference with General Hugh Scott and George Carothers a week
later, Villa agreed to return all the merchandise.

21

Villa had also decreed on July 26 that all mine and smelter
owners were to meet at Chihuahua City on August 9; he intended that
they should pay him a 300,000 dollar loan.

22

The owners feared that

Villa might implement the notorious Decree Number 5 and confiscate
their property if they did not heed his demands.

23

Villa relented

again, agreeing not to demand the money; grateful owners donated
1 ,000 tons of coal to his army.

24

Several explanations can be given suggesting why Villa behaved
this way. General Scott believed that Villa cooperated with American
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demands simply out of faith in United States intentions not to recognize Carranza and out of his friendship for General Scott.

25

Fearing

American recognition of Carranza, with the certain closing of the
border, Villa probably wished to keep the cordial ties which gave him
access to supplies. It was shown that in July and August and until
mid-September, large supplies of munitions were bound to him from
the United States. These munitions were vulnerable to seizure in the
event Villa followed through on his threats.
Villa's continued cooperation fit into American efforts to mediate
the revolution.

Not wishing to recognize Carranza, the United States

government worked to keep Villa afloat financially as a balancing
against Carranza's power.

26

Through the efforts of Secretary of

State Lansing, Villa received permission to export slaughtered beef
into El Paso in early August.

27

This was part of a plan whereby

a mediated peace could be achieved without Carranza becoming
President.

28

A final American attempt to arrange a mediated settlement
eliminating Carranza began in mid-August. General Scott received
permission to contact Alvaro Obregon in hopes of forming an alliance
which excluded Carranza.

29

<
Obregon remained loyal to Carranza,

the plan collapsed and Scott returned to Washington.

30

The plan

indicated just how far the American administration was willing to go
to install any leader except Carranza as Mexico's President. This
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policy favored Villa who had shown himself pliable to American
requests; in doing so he received financial rewards.
Villa's open hostility to American firms after the recognition of
Carranza correlated with the closing of the border and the end of his
purchases of munitions. Orders came from Washington on October 9,
1915 to halt shipments of arms; but as has been shown, Villa's shipments four weeks prior to that date had all but ended.

31

*

The sale of confiscated goods from Juarez to El Paso continued
throughout September and well beyond the closing of the border for
munition exports. Villa's agency continued to sell goods—receiving
100,000 dollars cash in one week in September—however, the
increased rampant grafting on the part of agents reduced the effectiveness that this organization had in delivering supplies to Villa.

32

By early October, Villa's attitude toward Americans changed.
Americans could no longer count on exemptions from Villa's decrees.
He took 1 ,000 head of cattle from the Corralitos Cattle Company; in
past times, he merely taxed them.

33

In early November, as his

remaining troops moved to Sonora to regroup with the forces of Jose
Maria Maytorena, Villa demanded forced loans of 25,000 dollars from
four American mining companies.

34

He did not relent in his demands.

Clearly, Villa had ended his pro-American favoritism.
Villa boasted to the American press on October 9, 1915 that he
commanded an army of 40,000 men, all well-armed and anxious to
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fight.

35

His claims of being well-armed were no doubt accurate.

His

claims of having 40,000 motivated troops were greatly overstated.
Cobb reported that Villa led an army of 7,000.

36

he led were disheartened and deserting in droves.

In any case, those
37

By the end of his

third disaster at Agua Prieta—where he ordered his troops to their
deaths in the same style as he did at Celaya and Leon—his agents in
El Paso were being sued by suppliers.

38

Clendenen maintained that when the United States recognized
Carranza Villa still comanded a "formidable" army.
as many as 10,000 troops and sufficient munitions.

39

He still had

His army though

was hardly the fighting force it had once been. His soldiers were
dispirited and his officers clamored for an end of combat.

40

Desei—

tions, formerly the problem for opposing armies, now had become
rampant within Villist ranks. Many of his best generals left him
seeking asylum in the United States.

41

The difference that arms supplies made in Villa's campaigns
seemed less significant in the latter stages of the revolution than they
did in the opening months of his drive against Huerta. The friendly
American border gave him easy access to munitions enabling him to
equip the men who flocked to join the Division of the North. His army
had grown to over 40,000 men by the beginning of January. As he
built his army, his access to cotton, cattle, and other forms of wealth
expanded. This enabled him to purchase additional supplies to arm

127

additional men.

In sum, Villa's strength steamrolled forward in the

first year and a half of his campaign. The arms he gained certainly
propelled his rise to power. Yet the key to his success was his ability
to draw men to fight with him. Without troops, no amount of muni
tions Villa secured would have won battles.
Men joined Villa in part because he epitomized the caudillo
tradition in Mexico. He boldly led his soldiers into battle, showing
all that he was more of a man than anyone else. Fearless in the
fight, adept with women, horses, and guns, Villa possessed the
charismatic qualities essential for drawing recruits. He was "virile
(in Mexico, muy macho) earthy, passionate, given to emotional out42
bursts."
These traits coupled with his fierce hatred of his foes
helped to explain both his success and failure.
The second explanation for his successes and failures was the
way in which he directed the forces he commanded. His tactic of
direct frontal assault served him well against the unenthusiastic and
largely conscripted army of Huerta.

43

His troops, confident of

victory, responded to his orders. Their massed charges won battles
at Ojinaga, Torreon, and Zacatecas.

By the spring of 1915, those

tactics proved ineffective, yet Villa refused to adapt to the new circum
stances he faced. He fought a more determined and enthusiastic
enemy—which was well-led and well-supplied.

He had never been
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defeated. Then he had the largest and most well-equipped army, yet
he lost. His repeated squandering of men cost him victory.
Villa claimed he lost the battle of Celaya because he lacked
ammunition.

Records of arms shipments supported that assertion.

However, the same records showed that large quantities of munitions
came to his army following the battle and throughout the remainder of
the summer months. Villa's weaknesses were not supplies but in
how he used the forces he had.

Impatient for victory—although under

no pressure to attack—Villa charged ahead.

By waiting, he was assured

of more men and more munitions and better artillery support. His
armies might have been able to take Tampico if Villa had delayed.
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Villa's lack of ammunition ended before the battle of Leon.
Large supplies reached him along with reinforcements, but he achieved
the same result. His army rushed into the teeth of well-prepared
defenses and were massacred.

No matter how well-provisioned,

few armies can sustain themselves fighting in that manner.

No

commander can waste thousands of soldiers in repeated attempts to
dislodge an enemy. This second defeat broke the confidence of his
troops.

Now it was Obreg*on who was undefeated, the supreme

caudillo. Villa had been soundly beaten, something which men who
lead by charisma can ill afford. Without a will to fight, the army
crumbled. Ironically, as this process took place, munitions flowed
to his army.
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This flow of munitions suggested that the German government
may have backed Villa as early as April 1915. Research by Michael
Meyer confirmed that the Germans were involved in financing Huerta's
attempted return to power in the spring of 1915.
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Barbara Tuchman

showed the German interest in supporting the Carranza government in
a possible war with the United States on the eve of American entry in
the First World War. The Germans were obviously working to support
any faction which might occupy the United States in conflict, and thus
keep America out of the European struggle.

If the Germans supplied

Villa with munitions in the spring of 1915, as this preliminary research
indicates, it was certainly consistent with their intrigues with Huerta
and Carranza.
During the summer of 1915, Villa lost the support of the people.

46

Without their backing, he could not mount an army. Oddly, it was
Carranza who best summarized the relationship between munitions and
Villa's successes. In an interview at Veracruz on August 31 , a
journalist asked Carranza if an embargo on munitions from the United
States would shorten the revolution.

"I do not think so," Carranza

said, "as we had to start against Huerta without arms when Huerta
had immense supplies of all kinds of munitions. He was defeated in
spite of that fact, the very evident reason being that the Constitutiona47
lists had the people supporting their movement."
It was not a shortage
of munitions which kept Villa from triumph, it was rather his rash
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direction of the massive force he commanded.

Having Tost at Celaya

and Leon, he lost the confidence and support of the Mexican people.
Without this, no amount of ammunition mattered.
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